The militant group Hezbollah once operated across Syria like a powerful military force, with thousands of fighters, open supply routes, and visible bases that helped keep Bashar Assad’s government in power for years.
Today, Syrian officials say what remains of Hezbollah’s presence looks vastly different: small covert operations near Damascus using drones and Katyusha rockets, with weapons officials claim originated from Lebanon.
On February 1st, Syria’s new leadership announced they had broken up a cell suspected of firing rockets at the Mezzeh district and a nearby military airport. Hezbollah’s media office denied these accusations, stating the organization “has no presence or activity on Syrian soil” and rejecting any connections to armed groups in Syria.
This incident illustrates how the post-Assad period has transformed Hezbollah’s operations. Where the group previously supported Assad’s war efforts openly, it now faces allegations of conducting secretive missions using basic equipment.
Syria served as Hezbollah’s crucial land route to Iran’s weapons supply networks. That pathway is now being severed from several directions.
In early February, Lebanese military forces discovered their second major Hezbollah tunnel in southern Lebanon within two months, containing ammunition, missiles, and drones. A senior American official confirmed that US intelligence assisted in locating the site, with Admiral Brad Cooper of US Central Command commending the discovery.
Simultaneously, Lebanese forces shut down unauthorized border crossings in the northern Beqaa Valley, a region historically used for smuggling weapons and drugs. Military officials announced the closure of additional crossings as part of an expanded enforcement effort along the approximately 233-mile border.
The US Treasury also imposed sanctions on a Turkey-based company involved in transporting Iranian fertilizer through Oman and targeted a gold trading business created by Hezbollah’s financial division to convert organizational assets into cash for reconstruction efforts.
Brigadier General Fayez al-Asmar, speaking for the Syrian military, explained that the new government confronts challenges from multiple sources.
“There is no doubt that since the fall of the former Assad regime, the Syrian state has been facing overlapping security challenges from multiple directions that include Israel, ISIS, remnants of the former regime, and armed groups operating outside state control,” al-Asmar told The Media Line.
Defense expert David Des Roches emphasized that losing unrestricted land access through Syria represents one of Hezbollah’s most significant setbacks in the post-Assad era.
“Hezbollah has long operated as a ‘state within a state,’ and losing unimpeded land access across Syria is a major strategic blow,” Des Roches told The Media Line. “Without Syria as an open corridor, Hezbollah shifts from being an organized military force with reliable supply routes into something closer to a network dependent on smuggling and limited access.”
This transformation alters Hezbollah’s operational footprint even without eliminating it entirely. Power once demonstrated through visible deployments and established routes now operates through intermediaries, small cells, and unofficial border crossings that are simpler to deny and more difficult to verify.
Brigadier General (retired) Yossi Kuperwasser, director of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and former Israeli intelligence official, noted that Hezbollah is attempting to recover from simultaneous setbacks, with Syria remaining part of that recovery effort.
“Hezbollah is trying to recover from the damage it has suffered—not only because of what is happening in Iran and Lebanon, but also because of what happened in Syria,” Kuperwasser told The Media Line. “They are trying to rebuild a presence, especially in the south, through smaller cells. But their achievements are limited, because Israel’s presence and readiness to act make it difficult for them.”
Kuperwasser explained that Hezbollah has preserved some operations near the Lebanese border and continues using smuggling networks for weapons transport. While Syrian authorities may interrupt some routes, he said, they cannot stop all of them.
“Hezbollah still manages activity in Syria near the Lebanese border,” he said. “They have been able to build cells that help smuggle weapons. Syrian authorities have tried to stop some of these efforts, but not all, and some smuggling continues successfully. It is not the strategic infrastructure it once was, but the network has not been fully dismantled.”
These evaluations help explain Israel’s expanded military stance in southern Syria in recent months. Israeli officials describe their presence near the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon as preventative measures designed to stop Hezbollah and other Iranian-supported groups from establishing positions near the border. Critics view this expanded presence less as temporary security measures and more as efforts to influence the post-Assad situation in Israel’s favor.
“Israel believes it needs a military presence to prevent Hezbollah and Iranian-backed cells from deploying in southern Syria,” Kuperwasser said. “Even if Syria’s new leadership appears pragmatic, Israel is cautious because many of its figures come from jihadist backgrounds. The US would prefer a solution that makes Israel’s presence unnecessary, but for now it understands Israel’s logic.”
Damascus is working to rebuild centralized governance after years of fragmentation, militia control, and competing armed networks.
Al-Asmar characterized the Mezzeh case as one aspect of a larger battle over who controls Syria’s security environment.
“In this environment, security agencies are watching closely for cells tied to external agendas that are trying to exploit Syria’s transition.”
A security official from the Syrian Interior Ministry reported that no additional Hezbollah cell activities have been uncovered or disrupted since the Mezzeh announcement.
“If any such activity is uncovered, it will be officially announced through statements issued by the Syrian Interior Ministry,” the security official said.
The source acknowledged the possibility of dormant cells that could remain inactive while waiting for changes in regional conditions. Such networks, the source added, might attempt to create instability if the US launches strikes against Iran.
Al-Asmar warned that the danger comes from networks that combine political objectives with smuggling and criminal financing, enabling external actors to maintain influence while the state attempts to regain control.
“By announcing this operation now, the Syrian state is sending a message domestically and internationally that it is regaining its capacity,” al-Asmar said. “The point is not only to stop a single cell, but to show that Damascus will not allow anyone—whoever they may be—to undermine national security, threaten neighboring countries, or destabilize social peace.”
Hezbollah has strong reasons to avoid confirming any of these allegations. Acknowledging a Syrian presence could force the new authorities into public confrontation and provide Israel with additional justification for military strikes. Within Lebanon, any admission would create difficulties while the group already faces pressure.
No official response came from Beirut. Writing in the Lebanese newspaper An-Nahar, columnist Rosanna Bou Mounsef observed that the party rejected any connection, claiming its name had been “dragged in arbitrarily.” Critics, she noted, view ongoing cross-border activities as either network reconstruction or a justification used by adversaries to portray Hezbollah as destabilizing.
Even analysts sympathetic to Hezbollah argue the group’s priorities have become more focused. Lebanese political analyst Rabih Ghosn said Hezbollah’s main Syrian interest is now stability.
“What matters to Hezbollah in Syria today is political and military stability,” Ghosn told The Media Line. “Hezbollah sees Syria’s unity under a centralized authority in Damascus as a priority at this stage, and believes that stability in Syria reflects positively on Lebanon.”
Ghosn maintained that the immediate threat from Hezbollah’s viewpoint is not Damascus asserting control but Israel expanding its military presence in the south.
“The main threat Hezbollah faces in Syria today is Israeli military expansion and the construction of bases, which we have seen in Mount Hermon and in areas adjacent to Daraa,” he said. “Political differences exist, but they do not amount to hostility.”
However, not all observers accept this interpretation. A report in the Beirut daily Al Joumhouria suggested Hezbollah was maneuvering to gain time, using concealment and delays until conditions improve, coordinating with Iran. The strategy reportedly included proposing to place weapons under supervisory oversight and promoting figures with stronger political profiles, moves intended to prevent Israeli military action and delay plans to restrict arms north of the Litani River.
Des Roches noted that Hezbollah’s limitations are also internal, influenced by pressure within Lebanon and the long-term costs of conflict.
“The loss of freedom of movement in Syria is extremely valuable for Israel, and extremely damaging for Hezbollah, because it limits how easily the group can move material across the region,” he said. Meanwhile, the US Treasury Department announced measures to disrupt what it described as two key mechanisms Hezbollah uses to maintain economic stability: generating revenue in coordination with Iran and exploiting Lebanon’s informal financial sector.
Within Lebanon, these pressures are tangible. Nearly 100,000 housing units were destroyed during the fighting with Israel. Hezbollah’s secretary general announced the organization would cover three months’ rent for displaced families, but the change from annual to quarterly payments indicates reduced capacity.
Residents in Shia areas have complained about unequal payments and lack of long-term guarantees. One resident of Beirut’s southern suburbs reported receiving $2,000 for four months, while a neighbor received $3,000 for six months, with no explanation for the difference. In Dahieh, rents now range from $300 to $600, often exceeding the official minimum wage of approximately $312.
In Taybeh, a south Lebanon border town located about 4 miles from the Israeli frontier, graffiti appeared on the municipality building demanding housing assistance “without favoritism.”
The danger in southern Syria is that each side’s protective measures become provocations to the other. Syria frames security operations as restoring sovereignty; Hezbollah interprets them as political targeting. Israel frames military activity as deterrence; Damascus sees it as violation. When Hezbollah moves to maintain a smuggling route, Israel treats it as confirmation that the threat persists.
Previously, Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operated storage facilities, missile infrastructure, and networks inside Syria with minimal interference. That access is no longer assured.
Hezbollah’s influence is neither completely eliminated nor fully restored. What remains operates more quietly: intermediaries instead of battalions, smuggling operations instead of convoys, small cells instead of bases. The old corridor may be disrupted, but the motivation to maintain networks persists.
“It forces Hezbollah to adapt to a much more limited and risky environment,” Des Roches said. “But history shows that tactical victories can create long-term consequences.”
