The passing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has eliminated the nation’s most influential political figure, leaving a critical leadership void in a government structure designed around concentrated religious authority. This development has immediately raised questions about which faction will assume control of the country.
Within Iran’s governmental framework, the supreme leader maintains authority over elected bodies and exercises final control over major state institutions, particularly security forces. While the nation’s constitution designates the Assembly of Experts to choose the next supreme leader, political observers have questioned how this transition period will unfold.
However, Middle East researcher Beni Sabti from Tel Aviv’s Institute for National Security Studies believes real power now rests with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its connected organizations, including the Basij militia.
Sabti, an Iranian native born in 1972 who lived through the Islamic Revolution before fleeing to Israel in 1987, explained that Iran’s current power structure will be shaped by interconnected figures with strong Revolutionary Guard connections. “Most of these figures always come from the IRGC. They have some roots in the IRGC … and also the IRGC as a whole, as an entity, influences a lot,” he stated.
The expert emphasized that today’s Revolutionary Guard holds significantly more influence compared to when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died in 1989. “It was not like this when Khomeini died, because he kept them limited,” Sabti noted. “But Khamenei was in their alliance, and they were his allies, so they have a kind of symbiotic relationship.”
According to Sabti, the IRGC operates “behind the curtain, for sure.” Although the Assembly of Experts maintains constitutional responsibility for selecting a successor, he contends this process serves more as formal approval rather than genuine decision-making.
“These councils of experts … they are also very symbolic,” he observed. “Eighty-eight very old clerics, that they have to decide who can be the next leader. They waited for someone to tell them what to do.” Sabti argued the Assembly has historically followed the existing leader’s direction and remains structurally dependent on the system it supposedly oversees. “They have been receiving salaries for so many years from the leader, so they are kind of the slaves of the system.”
Sabti anticipates this pattern will continue. “They will wait for someone to tell them what to vote for. Maybe the council, or IRGC, all together.”
Regarding the current presidency, Sabti believes it carries minimal independent authority during this succession phase. “President Pezeshkian is a good puppet for now to do his job, and after that, they can kick him out and give him just a symbolic job, because he’s not a cleric. As you see, he doesn’t have any influence,” he said.
The researcher’s main thesis suggests the outcome depends less on constitutional processes and more on whether the Revolutionary Guard maintains unity. “Yes, there is a chance that there can be some divisions in the IRGC,” he acknowledged. He believes any internal fractures would largely depend on continued external pressure. “It depends on if US and Israel continue to try to destroy as much as possible of this regime,” he explained.
Under such pressure, Sabti suggested some factions might choose survival over ideological commitment. “Some of them can come out and say, OK, we don’t want to lose our heads, we don’t want to lose Iran as a country, so maybe we can have some compromises,” he elaborated.
He also mentioned possibilities of internal coups and confrontations, drawing parallels to Soviet-era instability. “They can make a coup or something, and there can be some clashes inside the IRGC,” he said.
Without Khamenei’s presence, Sabti warned that competing ambitions within the IRGC and other power centers might escalate as various actors reassess their positions. “What is the map of the interests of everyone? It can change now, because the leader is not there,” he said. “They have their new interests. So yes, there can be a huge clash inside IRGC or other systems.”
Beyond political maneuvering, Sabti described a significant divide between the government and portions of the population. “The people … they came out and they were very happy, many of them,” he said. He noted that authorities quickly moved to limit information access. “We see that the regime once again shut down the internet, and we don’t know much what is going on inside.”
He suggested leadership priorities center on maintaining power rather than public welfare. “They don’t care now about the people. The regime doesn’t care about whether there are supplies in the supermarkets, or the roads are open, or anything like that.” He highlighted what he called inadequate civilian protection measures. “You know that there are no sirens in Iran, and no shelters? This is amazing. They don’t care about the people. It’s just like the ’80s.”
Despite public frustration and what he described as celebrations, Sabti doubted spontaneous mass protests would occur without external encouragement and organization. “The people cannot act unless President Trump, again, says something or does something,” he said. He noted the regime maintains organized forces and structural advantages. “There are many Basij forces outside. They [the citizens] don’t have connection. Someone has to guide them.”
Looking forward, Sabti predicted instability will continue. “In the short term, they [the IRGC] will be more dangerous,” he said. He believes the next period will be influenced by additional attacks on command centers and leadership figures. “But again, in a few days, if enough headquarters, and IRGC generals, and other figures are eliminated, there can be something else there,” he added.
He warned that any timeline should be considered in weeks rather than days, given Iran’s scale and complex security structure. “When you talk about Iran, it’s such a huge country, so many divisions, so many units of IRGC and army,” he said.
When asked about potential tipping points, Sabti said rapid collapse seems unlikely. “I think not less than two weeks,” he said. “Even Saddam held for three weeks.”
Other experts note that any successor will still require religious legitimacy, even if security leadership influences the selection. The upcoming period, Sabti suggested, may be determined less by constitutional procedures and more by internal reassessment among security officials—particularly within the IRGC. The critical factor, he argued, is whether the IRGC remains united.
