International discussions about connecting Gaza’s reconstruction to Hamas giving up its weapons briefly gained momentum last week before quickly losing steam as escalating US-Iran tensions captured global diplomatic focus.
Sources from diplomatic and regional channels indicated that progress on rebuilding efforts was being connected to steps toward weapon surrender, though no official ultimatum was delivered. However, within just a few days, focus had returned to the Washington-Tehran crisis, once again leaving Gaza’s political future in limbo. No official or enforceable disarmament agreement has been established, leaving the matter caught between political messaging and actual execution.
The shift wasn’t merely political in nature. International engagement, security cooperation, and diplomatic efforts that were once focused on determining Gaza’s post-conflict arrangements became increasingly redirected toward preventing escalation with Iran. Gaza’s long-term leadership and security issues momentarily returned to diplomatic discussions, only to be overshadowed by broader regional tensions before any concrete mechanism or agreement could take shape.
This recent push was part of a wider US-led initiative, referred to in diplomatic circles as the “Board of Peace,” designed to influence post-conflict governance in Gaza. Under this approach, weapon surrender has been viewed as a key requirement for reconstruction funding, international participation, and the potential deployment of external administrative or security forces in the territory. However, the initiative continues to lack effective enforcement mechanisms or strong enough guarantees to force armed groups to comply. While political pressure exists, there remains no functional system to convert it into actual disarmament.
Michael Milshtein, who leads Palestinian Studies at the Moshe Dayan Center, informed The Media Line that Hamas has shown no indication it’s willing to give up its weapons, despite diplomatic pressure or broader regional escalation. According to his assessment, the organization might be open to discussing restrictions on specific weapons, but not complete demilitarization.
“We all heard Abu Obeida”—the nom de guerre used by the current anonymous spokesman for Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades—”on Sunday when he said in a very clear manner that Hamas is not ready even to consider any disarmament. And he actually said that all the reports about progress in the negotiations about disarmament—it’s all nonsense, because it’s very clear that Hamas is not ready to be flexible on this point.”
“They can negotiate about the weapons, what kind of weapons they can keep, but they will never negotiate total disarmament.”
Milshtein contended that even a US-supported post-conflict arrangement would more likely rebrand Hamas rather than eliminate it. He believes the organization could accept a new governing appearance while maintaining armed capabilities and political control, similar to Hezbollah’s structure in Lebanon.
“All the Palestinians talk a lot today about what will happen on the day after the war with Iran. Many of them really wish that on the day after, Trump will promote a kind of political settlement in Gaza, based on the arrival of a bureaucratic government to Gaza, and even the arrival of international forces and their deployment in Gaza.”
“It’s quite clear that Hamas is ready right now to accept all these demands, and actually to establish a kind of local model of Hezbollah in Gaza—means that they will keep their weapons, they will keep their influence in Gaza, but they will not really be ready for this total disarmament.”
He connected this argument to a wider lesson regarding Israel’s military objectives, stating that complete victory over Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran-supported groups is not realistically possible in the manner some leaders have presented it.
“Right now, on all the fronts Israel deals with—I mean Lebanon and Iran and Hamas, Gaza—Netanyahu didn’t achieve any total victory and erasing the enemy. The enemy still exists—very, very weak, but dominant.”
“We need to understand and realize that the warfare today, or the nature of our enemies, you cannot really achieve a kind of total eradication of these enemies from the map. You will need to repeat fighting them again and again and again.”
This evaluation also aligns with a broader change in diplomatic conversations, where complete disarmament is increasingly being compared with more limited or gradual arrangements. Some proposals have examined restricting heavy weapons, long-range capabilities, or offensive systems while permitting other forms of armament to stay, though none of these concepts has been formalized into a binding agreement.
Amjad Salfiti, a Palestinian British attorney who specializes in human rights and international law, examined the issue from a different angle. He contended that connecting reconstruction to disarmament risks pressuring civilians instead of armed groups and may violate fundamental humanitarian principles.
“A key feature of the proposal is the conditioning of reconstruction assistance on the disarmament of Palestinian armed groups,” he told The Media Line. “Under international humanitarian law, humanitarian relief must be guided by necessity and impartiality and should not be made conditional on political or military concessions.”
Salfiti explained that such proposals could establish coercive situations by making access to housing, healthcare, and infrastructure dependent on meeting security requirements.
“Linking reconstruction to disarmament risks creating coercive conditions in which civilians are indirectly pressured to accept security demands in order to access essential services such as housing, healthcare, and infrastructure.”
“This may be inconsistent with the prohibition on collective punishment and the principle of impartial humanitarian assistance.”
He also challenged the framework’s legitimacy, arguing that it has been developed mainly through external mediation without clear mechanisms for local approval, while missing reciprocal obligations such as binding guarantees on hostilities or humanitarian access.
“The reported framework appears to have been developed primarily through external mediation, without clear mechanisms for local consent or representation. This raises questions about legitimacy and compliance with the requirement that arrangements in affected territories act in the interests of the local population.”
“The absence of clear reciprocal obligations—such as binding guarantees on cessation of hostilities or unimpeded humanitarian access—creates an asymmetrical structure that may undermine established norms governing armed conflict and occupation.”
Salfiti additionally cautioned that staged reconstruction tied to compliance could generate legal and ethical issues if assistance is distributed selectively rather than based on need.
“The proposed suggestion that reconstruction could be delivered in phases based on compliance introduces further legal and ethical concerns. Selective aid distribution risks violating the principle of non-discrimination in humanitarian assistance, which requires that relief be provided based solely on need.”
Combined, these concerns indicate that even if disarmament were politically achievable, the mechanisms currently being discussed could still encounter serious legal obstacles.
This has resulted in a divided international response. While the United States has led much of the current initiative, European nations and multilateral organizations have expressed caution, particularly regarding the legal implications of conditional reconstruction and the absence of a clearly authorized international framework.
For Gaza’s civilian population, estimated at approximately two million people and already experiencing severe humanitarian conditions, the impact is immediate. Reconstruction, governance, and security affect daily life, access to vital services, and any hope of long-term stability.
Currently, Hamas disarmament remains a diplomatic goal without a practical implementation pathway. No definitive framework has developed for disarmament, reconstruction, or governance, leaving Gaza’s civilians still awaiting solutions while broader regional issues draw global attention elsewhere.
