The meeting between Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and US President Donald Trump in Washington on July 21 carried considerable symbolic weight, but the harder challenge is playing out far from the White House — in southern Lebanon and across the regional supply corridors that have long funneled weapons to Hezbollah.
The two leaders’ discussions centered on Hezbollah’s arsenal, building up the Lebanese Armed Forces, and securing an Israeli pullback from Lebanese territory. The talks also touched on a longer-term goal that, until recently, would have been politically difficult for a Lebanese president to state so publicly.
During the meeting, Aoun described the framework’s ultimate aim as “ending the state of hostility between Lebanon and Israel forever” — framing the effort not as a temporary halt to fighting, but as part of a deeper process meant to keep Lebanon from falling back into cycles of conflict.
On the ground, Israeli forces have begun pulling back from specific areas in southern Lebanon, allowing Lebanese army units to move in as part of a pilot program designed to test whether the Lebanese state can gradually take full control of its own security. The pace is expected to remain slow, with any expansion tied to how well the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) perform and whether the broader framework holds.
Marwan Abdallah, head of the Foreign Affairs Department at the Lebanese Kataeb Party, said external guarantees would remain essential to the process. “So, now we are waiting to see the implementation. We saw … before the meeting in the White House, the Lebanese army started taking control of two areas in South Lebanon, as per the framework agreement,” he told The Media Line.
He went further, arguing that a neutral party would be needed to make the arrangement work: “You need a third entity, and I think the US army is the partner of the Lebanese armed forces and, of course, is the partner of the Israelis, so they can play a role in being the monitoring side and being the one that guarantees the agreement between both sides.”
Joe Truzman, a Middle East independent analyst, called the pilot zones a test of a far bigger question — whether Lebanon can become the only security authority in the south. “The pilot zones are designed to test whether the Lebanese Armed Forces can assume responsibility for territory following Israeli withdrawals under the US-brokered framework while preventing Hezbollah from re-establishing an armed presence. Success would strengthen confidence in the Lebanese state’s ability to become the sole security actor,” he said.
Truzman also sounded a note of caution, pointing out that “the Lebanese government’s previous disarmament efforts stalled and produced only partial results in the south.” He noted that moving forward would require several actors to advance in step with one another: “Expansion will depend on sustained LAF performance, Israeli confidence that Hezbollah is not reconstituting its military infrastructure, Hezbollah’s own response, and continued external political and financial support for the Lebanese state and its army.”
For Abdallah, the challenge extends well beyond Hezbollah’s missiles. He argued the group’s entire parallel structure — outside state authority — must be addressed. “I have a problem with Hezbollah’s missiles, drones, military units, assassination units, small bombs, small weapons, medium weapons, everything that Hezbollah has, ideology, education institutions, financial institutions,” he said. He described these as “illegal and illegitimate ways of Hezbollah gaining more power and gaining more control over their population.”
Abdallah also highlighted what he sees as a shift in Lebanon’s international standing following the Washington meeting. “It’s not easy to be received this way by Trump. … Okay, now Lebanon is back on the map. Lebanon is a country that’s respected as a sovereign nation, as a partner, not just as a state who is a source of trouble and the problems,” he told The Media Line.
The meeting also produced a notable shift in aviation policy. President Trump announced he was directing his administration to allow US airlines to operate direct flights to Lebanon — reversing a restriction that has been in place since 1985. Actual service will still require regulatory approvals and decisions by individual airlines, but after more than four decades without direct US-carrier routes, the announcement carries symbolic importance for a country trying to present itself as a viable destination for business, tourism and investment.
Abdallah framed the significance in broader terms: “But again, it’s not just about the flight itself. It’s about what it represents: a renewed trust in Lebanon … that these flights can be secure and protected.”
Truzman offered a more measured view of the aviation announcement, noting that political declarations and practical reality remain separate. “The announcement regarding direct US–Lebanon commercial flights is important but remains contingent on FAA/TSA security certification and airline decisions. It should be viewed as a conditional commitment that links deeper economic engagement to improvements in Lebanon’s security environment,” he said.
Both the aviation news and Aoun’s remarks about ending hostilities with Israel point to a larger theme running through the Washington visit: an effort to reposition Lebanon on the world stage while rebuilding state authority at home. But the credibility of that effort will hinge on what actually happens on the ground.
Hezbollah’s military strength has historically been tied to a broad regional logistics network linking Iran to its allies through Iraq and Syria. Recent seizures suggest that parts of this network are now under greater strain. Syrian authorities have announced multiple weapons interceptions allegedly bound for Hezbollah. In one significant case in July, Syrian officials said they seized a shipment near the Iraqi border containing missiles, anti-tank weapons and drones that preliminary investigations indicated were headed for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah denied the claim. Iraq subsequently launched an investigation into how the shipment reached the Syrian border and formed a committee to examine the matter in coordination with Damascus.
Abdallah interpreted these developments in Syria and Iraq as signs of a broader decline in Iranian influence. “I think that what the US is managing to do is taking these countries out of the grip of the Iranians,” he said. “And I think today, not even Sanaa, maybe Teheran still control the Houthis, but the other three capitals in the Arab world Baghdad, Beirut and Damascus are out of Iranian control, and it’s a big achievement, not just for the US, but for the people of these countries.”
He also interpreted President Trump’s comments about a possible Syrian role against Hezbollah as referring to the group’s logistical infrastructure rather than Syrian forces entering Lebanon. “I think what Trump means whenever he says that he wants the Syrians to interfere, to disarm Hezbollah, I think what he means is not the Syrian army entering Lebanon, but he means that Syria dismantling and destroying all the military infrastructure and the tunnels and the supply routes that Hezbollah and Iran made inside Syria for decades,” he said.
Truzman, however, cautioned against reading too much into individual weapons seizures. “I do not assess it as realistic to meaningfully degrade Hezbollah’s supply network without sustained cooperation from both Syria and Iraq. The logistics architecture is regional rather than linear: disrupting one corridor increases costs but does not eliminate the network,” he said. He added that while Syria has become a more active partner in blocking weapons flows, “Iraq remains the more uncertain variable, with uneven willingness among state institutions and Iran-aligned militias to enforce restrictions. Moreover, Tehran retains the capacity to adapt by rerouting shipments through alternative corridors, including maritime routes.”
Uncertainty also surrounds the pilot zones themselves. For the Lebanese army, the central challenge is extending state authority without triggering a direct confrontation with Hezbollah. “This remains a significant undertaking for the LAF, which has so far avoided direct confrontation with Hezbollah to preserve domestic stability,” Truzman said. “Hezbollah is likely to resist any expansion, generating friction between the state and the group that could stall enforcement and, at the extreme, risk internal conflict.”
For Abdallah and the Kataeb Party, the goal is clear: the complete dismantling of Hezbollah’s independent military infrastructure. “So it’s a new page for the country. It’s a new era. However, all this optimism cannot be achieved if we don’t solve the biggest problem, which is Hezbollah’s weapons and Hezbollah’s infrastructure,” he said. He argued that disarmament could eventually open the door to an Israeli withdrawal and a new kind of relationship across the border. “But we all agree that when Hezbollah is disarmed, then there’s no out-of-the-state threat for anyone in Lebanon or in Israel. Then the Israelis will withdraw, and we are already discussing having a new track for the negotiations that will discuss the border between the two countries.”
Lebanon and Israel remain technically at war, Israeli troops remain inside Lebanese territory, and deep disagreements persist over withdrawal, security and Hezbollah’s weapons. But the language coming out of Washington suggests the political horizon being discussed goes well beyond another temporary ceasefire. Abdallah also stressed that any future agreement would need backing inside Lebanon, not just from abroad. “So I think it can have the foreign support that is needed, but also we need to have the domestic support that we need for this agreement,” he said.
Truzman sees a more stable relationship between Beirut and Jerusalem as conceivable, but noted it would carry direct consequences for Hezbollah’s political identity. “A stable relationship between Beirut and Jerusalem is conceivable, but such an outcome would directly erode Hezbollah’s long-standing claim to legitimacy as an armed ‘resistance’ movement whose raison d’être is resistance against Israel,” he noted.
The weeks and months ahead will be measured less by what was said in Washington than by whether multiple processes can move forward at once: the Lebanese army consolidating its hold in the south, Israeli forces continuing their withdrawal, Hezbollah refraining from rebuilding military infrastructure in areas that have been transferred, and Syria and Iraq sustaining efforts to block cross-border weapons networks.
“Taken together, these developments suggest an increasingly coherent American strategic concept that combines pressure on Iranian proxy networks with incentives to strengthen state institutions in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq,” Truzman said. “The strategy’s long-term success, however, remains uncertain and depends on implementation across multiple theaters.”
The Aoun-Trump meeting may ultimately prove significant not because it resolved Lebanon’s core security questions, but because it brought several previously separate tracks into a single political framework — restoring Lebanese state authority, disrupting Hezbollah’s regional supply lines, achieving an Israeli withdrawal, reintegrating Lebanon economically and internationally, and potentially moving toward a more stable relationship along the Lebanese-Israeli border. Whether those goals can be turned from diplomatic language into lasting reality on the ground remains the central test.
