A pair of unusual cross-border media appearances involving Saudi Arabia and Israel has reignited debate over whether the two nations are carefully testing the waters for renewed engagement, even as Iranian military strikes put growing strain on Gulf security.
On July 16, Israeli President Isaac Herzog sat down for an exclusive interview with Al Arabiya English, a Saudi-based media outlet. During the interview, Herzog expressed his desire for closer ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia, voiced respect for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and called peace between the two nations his “dream.” He also raised the possibility of direct talks backed by Washington.
Three days later, Abdullah bin Ghanem Al-Qahtani — a former major general in the Royal Saudi Air Force who now works as a security and strategic affairs analyst — appeared on Israel’s Channel 12. He characterized Iran’s regional attacks as a serious threat requiring a response, while also emphasizing that Israel must address the Palestinian issue.
Such appearances by prominent Saudi figures on Israeli media are uncommon. Their timing has attracted significant attention given that Iranian strikes on Gulf infrastructure are testing Saudi Arabia’s long-standing strategy of keeping lines of communication open with Tehran while depending on the United States and other partners for its security.
The current crisis could make the case for broader regional defense cooperation — including behind-the-scenes coordination with Israel — without necessarily pushing the kingdom toward formal diplomatic recognition.
The two appearances have drawn comparisons to the period before October 7, 2023, when Saudi-Israeli normalization was openly discussed as part of a broader US-brokered arrangement involving security agreements and other bilateral deals. The Gaza war derailed those talks, and Riyadh has since made normalization dependent on meaningful movement toward Palestinian statehood. A Saudi source familiar with the matter, speaking anonymously due to the sensitivity of the issue, told The Media Line in May 2026 that the kingdom still required a clear and irreversible path toward Palestinian statehood.
Analysts caution that the renewed media contacts do not signal a resumption of formal negotiations — only that the kind of public communication seen during the earlier Saudi-Israeli rapprochement is once again taking place.
Cyril Widdershoven, a geopolitical and energy analyst and director at Strategy International in Cyprus, sees Herzog’s Al Arabiya interview as a possible indicator that Saudi-Israeli engagement has not been entirely shelved.
“It was politically significant because of the platform, timing, and message,” Widdershoven told The Media Line.
He noted that Al Arabiya is part of the Saudi media landscape and suggested that giving Herzog a platform to discuss peace and praise the crown prince may have been a way to test public and regional reactions. Still, Widdershoven acknowledged the interview does not represent an official shift in Saudi policy.
“The interview should be interpreted as political signaling rather than proof of an active normalization process,” he said. “Saudi Arabia can use such media engagement to remind Washington and Israel that rapprochement remains possible.”
He added that Riyadh could also use the prospect of normalization as leverage in negotiations for US security guarantees and civilian nuclear cooperation, while continuing to press Israel on Gaza and Palestinian statehood.
“Saying that pre-October 7 negotiations have fully restarted would go too far,” Widdershoven said. “Saying that communication channels and strategic calculations are being quietly reactivated would be reasonable.”
Not everyone agrees that Iranian attacks will automatically draw Saudi Arabia and the Gulf closer to Israel. Abdulaziz Alshaabani, a Saudi political analyst, told The Media Line that the escalation has pushed national security to the forefront, eclipsing any discussion of ties with Israel.
“In my view, it is still too early to conclude that the Gulf has abandoned diplomacy with Iran or that a fundamental regional realignment has taken place,” Alshaabani said. “Recent events have reinforced one clear priority: national security has become more important than any discussion about relations with Israel.”
His reading of Gulf policy suggests that attacks on critical infrastructure may drive demand for stronger defenses without necessarily ending diplomatic engagement with Tehran.
“This is my personal assessment, but I believe many in the Gulf remain committed to diplomatic solutions, including initiatives that Saudi Arabia has consistently supported,” Alshaabani said.
This reflects a key distinction between how Israel and the Gulf states view Iran. Israel has treated Iran primarily as a direct military adversary, while Gulf governments have tried to contain the confrontation through diplomacy and avoid becoming a battleground for larger powers.
“At the same time, the recent escalation has strengthened the perception that Israel has been more willing to sustain confrontation with Iran despite the potential risks to Gulf security and regional stability,” Alshaabani said.
Iran’s widening attacks across the Gulf are making that balancing act increasingly difficult. Recent strikes have moved beyond military bases and energy infrastructure to threaten the systems that ordinary civilians depend on every day.
Kuwait’s Ministry of Electricity, Water and Renewable Energy reported that an Iranian strike on July 17 hit a power generation and water desalination facility, damaging multiple electricity-generating units and triggering a fire. Authorities activated emergency plans, put out the blaze, and began repairs while keeping watch over the stability of the national power grid. The attack was especially alarming because Kuwait relies on desalination for more than 90% of its drinking water.
Water infrastructure had already been targeted elsewhere. Bahrain’s Interior Ministry reported that an Iranian drone struck a desalination plant on March 8, though Bahrain’s Electricity and Water Authority said the damage did not disrupt water or electricity service.
Iranian forces have also claimed attacks on US military facilities in Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait. On July 20, Bahraini authorities sounded missile-alert sirens and told residents to take shelter, while Kuwait reported that its air defenses were responding to another incoming Iranian barrage.
The conflict has escalated beyond the question of whether Gulf governments should side with Washington or stay out of a direct confrontation with Tehran. It now directly involves the protection of electricity, water, energy exports, ports, and other infrastructure that sustains everyday life.
Widdershoven described the Gulf approach as strategic hedging — maintaining dialogue with Tehran while counting on Western security guarantees — but warned that approach is becoming harder to hold together.
“The new Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti power and desalination infrastructure, taking into account also the strikes against Bahrain and other Gulf targets, increasingly show that this balance becomes untenable,” he said.
“Once Iran threatens civilian water, electricity, ports and energy assets, the engagement can no longer be treated as sufficient protection,” Widdershoven added.
A tougher security posture, he said, would not necessarily mean the Gulf is heading toward war with Iran. A more likely response would involve integrated air and missile defense systems, shared radar and intelligence networks, expanded naval patrols, stronger cyber capabilities, and better protection for ports, desalination facilities, and energy infrastructure.
How Saudi Arabia responds could determine whether the crisis leads to a formal regional realignment or simply another recalibration of the kingdom’s longstanding approach of maintaining ties across competing geopolitical camps.
For both Washington and Israel, the Iranian threat makes the case for deeper regional security integration. Israeli expertise and technology in countering Iranian missiles and drones could become increasingly relevant to Gulf defense planning if attacks on civilian and strategic infrastructure continue.
Riyadh, however, remains constrained by the Palestinian issue and its broader goal of preserving strategic independence rather than aligning firmly with any single geopolitical bloc.
Widdershoven believes those competing pressures could lead to limited security cooperation before any political normalization occurs.
“The most likely trajectory is therefore security convergence before diplomatic normalization: discreet intelligence cooperation, air-defense coordination, and shared threat monitoring first, with formal political relations remaining conditional,” he said.
Alshaabani urged caution against assuming such an alignment is already forming, arguing the conflict has reinforced the need to protect Gulf security and prevent further escalation rather than encouraging new political partnerships.
The media appearances by Herzog and Al-Qahtani are best understood as signs that public communication channels remain open — not as evidence that formal normalization is imminent. Iran’s attacks may give Saudi Arabia and Israel stronger reasons to cooperate on security, but Riyadh’s investment in diplomacy with Tehran and its insistence on Palestinian statehood progress remain unchanged. For now, the kingdom appears to be keeping all its options open as the Gulf’s traditional strategy of geopolitical hedging grows harder to sustain.
