The conflict involving Iran has intensified tensions between Israel and Turkey, transforming their already fractured diplomatic relationship into a more serious strategic confrontation over regional influence and military deterrence.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has criticized US-Israeli military actions against Iran from the beginning, while Israeli leaders have accused Turkey of directing more anger toward Israel than toward Iran, even after Iranian missiles violated Turkish airspace.
The deterioration between these former allies didn’t start with the current Iran situation. Israel and Turkey were once close strategic partners with robust military cooperation, but their relationship collapsed following the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident. Although both countries restored full diplomatic relations in 2022, those ties didn’t survive the Gaza conflict. Following October 2023, Turkey withdrew its ambassador and suspended trade with Israel in 2024.
The breakdown became evident not just in policy but in diplomatic presence. Israeli diplomatic personnel had already departed their Istanbul consulate after relations soured over the Gaza war. When armed attackers targeted the building housing the Israeli consulate in Istanbul on April 7, the absence of Israeli staff highlighted how dramatically the relationship had deteriorated from its brief 2022 recovery.
The Iran conflict provided a new battleground for these tensions. On February 28, Erdoğan stated that US-Israeli attacks violated Iran’s sovereignty and disrupted peace for Iranian citizens, while also condemning Iran’s retaliatory strikes against Gulf nations. Two days later, he called the strikes a “clear violation” of international law, saying, “As their neighbor and brother, we share the pain of the Iranian people.” Israeli officials viewed this language as evidence that Erdoğan was aligning himself closer to Tehran while attempting to portray Turkey as a regional peacemaker.
The dispute intensified when the conflict directly affected Turkish territory. Reuters and AP news agencies documented multiple March incidents where Iranian ballistic missiles entered Turkish airspace and were intercepted by NATO air defense systems, with debris landing in southeastern Turkey but causing no casualties. Turkey formally protested to Tehran and warned that such violations were unacceptable. However, Turkey did not launch military retaliation against Iran and chose not to activate NATO’s Article 4 consultation process or Article 5 collective defense provisions.
Turkish officials argue their measured response demonstrates Ankara’s commitment to preventing the region from descending into broader warfare. Israeli critics of Erdoğan interpret this same restraint as evidence that Turkey has treated Israel more harshly than Iran, even after being directly affected by the conflict.
The confrontation then expanded to social media platforms. Through posts shared by Turkish official and pro-government accounts on X, Erdoğan and other Turkish leaders characterized the war as destabilizing, illegal, and politically advantageous to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. One widely shared message from Erdoğan declared: “Every drop of blood shed in war sparked by US-Israeli attacks on Iran will prolong Netanyahu’s political survival.” Turkish presidency accounts also reinforced Erdoğan’s stance that Turkey opposed both the attacks on Iran and Iran’s retaliation against regional countries.
Israeli officials responded with public statements. According to reports citing Netanyahu’s April 11 X post, he wrote that “Israel under my leadership will continue to fight Iran’s terror regime and its proxies, unlike Erdoğan, who accommodates them and massacres his own Kurdish citizens.” Israeli media also reported that Defense Minister Israel Katz criticized Erdoğan for failing to respond forcefully even after Iranian missiles entered or threatened Turkish airspace, describing him as showing bluster without taking action.
Kobi Michael, a political analyst at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Misgav Institute, believes direct military confrontation between Israel and Turkey remains unlikely because both nations are close US allies and Washington maintains significant influence over each country. “That we have already reached the edge, and it cannot be worse than that, because Turkey and Israel are very close allies of the United States. The United States has a very heavy leverage on both countries. I don’t think that Israel wants to escalate the situation, not at all,” he explained to The Media Line. “But if Turkey tries to escalate the situation, then I think that the Americans will prevent them from doing that. They have the leverage on Turkey. I don’t believe that we will reach a military confrontation with the Turks.”
Michael suggested that Erdoğan perceives opportunities in Iranian weakness, regional instability, and Israel’s diplomatic challenges. “Erdoğan has hegemonic aspirations in the broader Middle East. He perceives Turkey and perceives himself as the leader of the Sunni world and of a future Ottoman empire,” he stated. “Erdoğan sees now an opportunity, a window of opportunity when Iran is weaker.” According to his analysis, this opportunity is enhanced by Israel’s diminished international standing and ideological shifts within Turkey that make a near-term reconciliation unlikely.
“Israel is in sort of a problematic situation when it comes to its position and standing vis-à-vis the international community,” he noted. “So, actually, this is a geostrategic game. … Erdoğan is trying to improve its strategic position amid the regional chaos and a very strong anti-Israel sentiment worldwide.”
Michael doesn’t anticipate improvement in relations anytime soon. “I don’t think that something will be changed dramatically in the foreseeable future because Turkey has become sort of a theocracy. … It is a Muslim Brotherhood country,” he said. “I don’t think that there will be any substantial changes in diplomatic terms between the two countries, unless there is a very significant political change in Turkey itself that will bring the opposition to power.”
Barın Kayaoğlu, chair of American studies at the Social Sciences University of Ankara, provided a contrasting perspective. He portrayed Turkey not as a nation moving toward Iran, but as an independent player whose restraint and regional approach are being misunderstood by Israel. “Turkey did take on Iran’s biggest proxy in the region, the Assad regime, and helped with its overthrow,” he told The Media Line, while also highlighting Ankara’s involvement in Iraq, despite Tehran’s influence there. “On both counts, Turkey has proven itself to be a more useful regional security actor than Israel,” he argued.
Kayaoğlu also dismissed Israeli criticism regarding NATO protocols. “It’s silly of the Israelis to claim that. Iran did not attack NATO. No one asked for Art. 4 consultations or for Art. 5 to be invoked,” he said. “Had the US government wanted NATO, they should’ve called for a meeting of the NAC.” He also minimized the significance of the airspace violations, stating, “Of the four Iranian ballistic missiles that strayed into Turkey’s airspace … only one went considerably well into Turkish airspace.”
He cautioned against any Israeli assumption that Turkey could be militarily pressured or contained. “Now, there seems to be some hope among the Israeli leadership that they could provoke the United States to attack Turkey. Very bad idea,” he warned. “Turkey’s ability to hurt Israel is even more varied than that of Iran.”
“Any military conflict between the two sides would be a disaster for both,” he added. Regarding diplomatic normalization, Kayaoğlu predicted it would only resume following significant political changes in Israel.
These two experts present fundamentally different interpretations of the same crisis. Michael views Erdoğan as exploiting the war, Iranian vulnerability, and Israel’s diplomatic difficulties to enhance Turkey’s strategic position. Kayaoğlu sees Turkey as an independent actor whose restraint and regional stance are being misinterpreted by Israel.
What has emerged is a relationship no longer primarily characterized by diplomatic disagreements, but by competing strategic narratives reinforced through public declarations, military incidents, and political messaging. While neither side appears to seek direct military confrontation, and both maintain ties to the United States and, in Turkey’s case, NATO membership, each new regional crisis provides both governments additional justification to argue that the other represents not merely a rival, but an active threat.
