Middle East Expert: Iran’s ‘Ring of Fire’ Strategy Around Israel Faltering

A Middle East scholar warns that Iran’s strategy of using terrorist proxy organizations to encircle Israel is facing significant challenges, though the Islamic Republic remains committed to maintaining these alliances.

Recent escalations began Tuesday following a day of military exchanges between Israel and Iran that concluded after American intervention, elevating the Lebanon-based Hezbollah terrorist group’s role as a significant regional force.

President Donald Trump quickly moved to pressure both Israel and Iran to cease their mutual attacks. According to media accounts, a heated phone call between President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu included the American leader threatening to withdraw support from Israel if it continued striking the Islamic Republic.

“The Trump administration has created a totally new and very bad reality,” Amatzia Baram, a professor emeritus at the University of Haifa and an expert in Middle Eastern politics, told The Media Line. “To appease Iran, they are willing to limit Israel in Lebanon. Washington wants this even more than the Lebanese government itself. This is a grave mistake.”

Weekend Israeli operations against Hezbollah prompted retaliatory action from Iran, establishing a new dynamic. For years, Israel viewed Hezbollah as its primary adversary. While Israel believed it had nearly neutralized Hezbollah by late 2024, it now finds itself constrained as Iran employs the organization as a shield, threatening to attack Israel if it targets this valuable proxy.

Monday’s brief period of military exchanges between Israel and Iran concluded with Iranian warnings of stronger retaliation if Israel continues operations in Lebanon.

Hezbollah commenced attacks on Israel two days following the joint American-Israeli offensive against Iran that started in March, culminating in a ceasefire one month afterward. Subsequently, Israel has maintained strikes on Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon, strengthening its foothold in the region, which Hezbollah considers a breach of the original November 2024 ceasefire agreement.

Hezbollah has maintained its rocket and drone attacks on northern Israel. Both parties are essentially breaking the ceasefire while attempting to manage violence levels and restrict attacks to northern Israel and southern Lebanon, keeping the Hezbollah stronghold of the Dahieh neighborhood in Beirut beyond Israel’s reach.

The ceasefire briefly collapsed when Israel targeted Hezbollah operatives in the Dahieh, deep inside Lebanon. Iran warned of retaliation for such strikes and followed through.

No casualties resulted from Iran’s missile attack on Israel. Iranian reports also indicated no casualties on their side.

“The Iranian attack appears to be an attempt to save face and not an effort to exact a price on Israel,” Dr. Menahem Merhavy, a research fellow and expert on Iran at the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, told The Media Line. “The attack extracted Iran from a trap.”

“Iran has been unsuccessful in leveraging what it believes was victory over the US and Israel,” Merhavy continued. “Iran is on the verge of catastrophe, and losing Hezbollah is a major source of stress for it.”

Iran has been orchestrating Middle Eastern affairs through multiple terrorist groups it has supported, funded, and trained over the years, establishing a “ring of fire” around Israel.

“The ‘ring of fire’ is currently stuttering,” said Merhavy. “But Iran won’t give up the idea and will not abandon Hezbollah.”

“Hezbollah has been weakened to about half of its previous abilities,” Baram said. “But still, they have significant ability to fight. Hezbollah is busy rebuilding itself, and despite Iran being in a difficult position, it is still helping Hezbollah—financially, militarily, and strategically by positioning itself as its defender and savior.”

“Hezbollah was meant to help Iran, not the opposite,” Baram continued. “The US bears responsibility for this.”

The October 2023 conflict started with an unexpected assault by Gaza-based Hamas against Israel and rapidly expanded into a regional war involving Iran’s proxy network. Israel’s counteroffensive has systematically dismantled this web, weakening Iran before its initial direct confrontation with Israel in April 2024.

“Iran’s latest attack and its quick signal that it finished retaliating, signals its unwillingness to enter another prolonged conflict because they cannot afford it,” said Merhavy.

Following Monday’s cessation of hostilities by both Iran and Israel, Netanyahu declared “our struggle with them has not ended yet,” referring to both Iran and Hezbollah.

“They are weaker than ever,” he added in an attempt to convince the public that Israel had the upper hand.

“Israel didn’t attack Hezbollah between 2006 to 2023 for one reason—it was afraid that the massive missile and rocket arsenal would cause major damage to Israel,” Baram said. “Now, Israel isn’t afraid of attacking Hezbollah because of its potential to cause damage, but rather Israel is concerned that Iran will get involved and the US will not support Israel if it chooses to respond to this.”

Tuesday saw Israeli military forces believed responsible for strikes against Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) did not provide confirmation.

Netanyahu has consistently promised to eliminate Hezbollah after the organization joined Gaza-based Hamas’ conflict against Israel in October 2023. Despite multiple wars and repeated fighting, Israel has failed to definitively neutralize Hezbollah’s threat. The group’s attacks primarily target northern Israel, severely disrupting daily life and creating substantial frustration.

“Attacks against Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon are small, tactical, and have little significance to Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon,” said Baram. “Attacks against command headquarters, weapons depots, and assembly factories in Beirut and north of Beirut are at an almost strategic level that can weaken Hezbollah, and that needs to be Israel’s target for the future.”

According to Merhavy, this new dynamic may prove temporary. However, currently Hezbollah faces considerable vulnerability to Israeli operations.

“Hezbollah can be pounded all over Lebanon, but Beirut and Iran can do absolutely nothing about it,” he said. “Israel has been able to act freely in Lebanon for months.”

Apart from its military strength, Hezbollah has established an extensive financial and social infrastructure deeply integrated into Lebanese society, particularly within the nation’s Shiite population. Through charitable organizations, educational institutions, medical services, reconstruction efforts, and direct monetary aid, the group has developed an alternative support structure that numerous Lebanese families rely upon, especially in regions where government services are inadequate. This entrenched social and economic presence has complicated efforts by both the Lebanese government and Israel to substantially diminish Hezbollah’s power.

“There is a lot of frustration with both Hezbollah and Iran amongst the Shiite community in Lebanon,” Merhavy said. “Iran has yet to provide funds to rebuild homes that were destroyed by the Israeli military in the past two years. Hezbollah terrorists are also unable to move freely in Lebanon for constant fear of being targeted by Israel.”

The circumstances are further complicated by conflicting objectives between Israel and the United States.

Netanyahu faces significant pressure from President Donald Trump to reduce operations against Hezbollah, with concerns that such actions could undermine negotiations for a lasting agreement between the US and Iranian leadership. Israel has also engaged in direct talks with the Lebanese government for several weeks. With US mediation, there is optimism that Beirut’s government could compel Hezbollah to retreat from southern Lebanon, thereby eliminating a major direct threat to Israel. Tehran has reportedly warned the Lebanese government against negotiating with Israel.

“It should be an American interest that Israel weakens Hezbollah,” said Baram. “Israel has no choice but to continue to engage in dialogue with the US. But because it is now extremely limited in conducting military strikes against Hezbollah, Israel must work with the US to target Hezbollah’s financial network and also cooperate with Syria against Hezbollah.”

The late 2024 fall of the Assad government in Syria significantly damaged Hezbollah’s regional standing by disrupting crucial supply lines used for transferring Iranian weapons through Syria into Lebanon. Israel has attempted to exploit Syria’s changing situation, conducting strikes within the country and restricting Hezbollah’s capacity to restore its military strength along Israel’s northern frontier.

This new arrangement allows all parties to declare success while creating fresh constraints. Israel can target Hezbollah but risks confrontation with Iran and tension with Washington. Iran can threaten escalation but seems hesitant to engage in another broader direct conflict. Hezbollah, formerly the cornerstone of Tehran’s regional deterrence approach, is increasingly focused on ensuring its own survival.

The consequences are significant. Whether this new balance persists or breaks down in another cycle of violence, the result will determine the power structure throughout the Middle East.