Israel’s Strategic Position Nearly 3 Years After the Oct. 7 Attack

Nearly three years have passed since Hamas carried out its shocking assault on Israel on October 7, dragging the country into a war on multiple fronts simultaneously. Today, Israel finds itself at a critical turning point, particularly as a newly announced US-Iran memorandum of understanding reshapes the dynamics of the broader region.

On the international stage, Israel remains largely on its own. Its military is still deployed in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and long-sought normalization with Saudi Arabia continues to be out of reach. None of the conflicts Israel has been engaged in has reached a definitive conclusion, and its relationship with Washington has grown increasingly complicated.

The preliminary framework between the US and Iran, reached earlier this week, marks a significant shift in the regional equation.

Israel has demonstrated its military reach across the Middle East, causing widespread destruction in Gaza and southern Lebanon while also launching airstrikes in Syria, Iran, Yemen, and Qatar. A strike carried out in September 2025 targeted Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, and sparked international condemnation for violating that country’s sovereignty.

Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli national security adviser who now teaches at Tel Aviv University and Columbia University, offered a stark assessment. “There is a great gap between the military picture and the strategic picture, which is one of overall defeat and collapse of Israel’s strategy,” he told The Media Line.

Despite Israel’s battlefield accomplishments, its core objectives remain elusive. “It did not succeed in destroying Hamas or unseating it from power, Hezbollah is coming back despite downgrading its capabilities greatly, and Iran believes with good reason that it won the war by surviving an attack by the world’s superpower and greatly out-negotiated the US, coming ahead on the diplomatic level as well,” Freilich added.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had pledged to dismantle Hamas in Gaza, completely destroy Hezbollah’s military capacity, and eliminate the nuclear threat posed by Iran.

On a more positive note, the Abraham Accords — the normalization agreements Israel struck with several Arab nations — have held up throughout the conflict, even when they appeared vulnerable. However, a deal with Saudi Arabia, something Netanyahu has long pursued and multiple US administrations have tried to broker, remains out of reach.

Prof. Jonathan Rynhold, a senior researcher at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, offered a mixed assessment: “All of Israel’s enemies are significantly weaker; there is wider interest in the Abraham Accords because of the threat from Iran, but Israel’s diplomatic and political situation internationally is much worse, particularly in the United States. Israel has been far more isolated than this during its history.”

The situation on each of Israel’s major fronts remains complicated. For decades, Israel has considered Iran its most serious strategic adversary and the main backer of the armed groups that encircle it. Joint American-Israeli strikes caused significant damage to Iranian military infrastructure and reportedly disrupted parts of Tehran’s nuclear program. However, the conflict ended without toppling the Islamic Republic, and Iran may have emerged with even stronger nuclear ambitions.

Iranian officials and state media declared victory, claiming Tehran had survived direct military action from both Israel and the United States while keeping its government and strategic position largely intact.

“Iran believes that it won the war, doing so by withstanding a major American and Israeli operation,” said Freilich. “They come out feeling stronger and invigorated. Israel and the US helped them achieve progress towards their goal of being a regional hegemon.”

The US-Iran memorandum highlighted Israel’s reliance on American diplomatic support while also exposing a rift between Netanyahu and President Donald Trump over what the ultimate outcome should look like. Israel sees Iran as a threat requiring ongoing pressure, while Washington has focused on preventing a wider war, reopening the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic, and stabilizing the region.

At this point, neither side has achieved a clear-cut victory. Iran came out militarily weakened but politically intact, while Israel demonstrated an impressive military reach without fully neutralizing the threat it set out to eliminate.

“Israel faces a real problem,” said Rynhold. “If Iran is not limited in its conventional missile stockpile, Israel will want to attack, and it will be constrained by the US.”

The future of sanctions on Iran also remains uncertain, with both sides agreeing to a 60-day window to negotiate the final terms of a deal. “From Israel’s perspective, the worse the Iranian dilemma between survival and building military power is, the better,” Rynhold said. “Sanctions relief would be a strategic failure if it becomes part of any future agreement between the US and Iran.”

When Hamas launched its surprise attack on October 7, 2023, thousands of militants crossed into Israel from the south. Netanyahu vowed to retaliate, promising to free all 251 hostages taken and remove Hamas from power. The military campaign that followed drew widespread international criticism, with some close allies accusing Israel of excessive force and war crimes — allegations Israel strongly rejects.

More than two and a half years later, a fragile ceasefire is holding, and all hostages — including the remains of those who died — have been returned. Israel currently controls more than half of the Gaza Strip, with Hamas still holding sway over the remainder. The next phase of the ceasefire, which would require Israel to withdraw, is tied to Hamas disarming — something the group has refused to do. Netanyahu has indicated Israel will maintain its presence in Gaza and has suggested the military could push even further into Palestinian territory.

“Hamas’ military capabilities are a fraction of what they were,” said Freilich. “They no longer constitute a military threat, but they constitute a threat to the forces in Gaza, and they are still in power politically. Israel will be forced to withdraw from Gaza sooner or later, whether it likes it or not.”

Freilich also noted that further military action in Gaza could happen now that no hostages remain there, and suggested Trump might give Netanyahu some leeway in Gaza, particularly ahead of an election.

Netanyahu leads a far-right coalition whose members support intensifying military pressure on Hamas. Meanwhile, international criticism of Israel has grown, ranging from genocide allegations brought by South Africa to cultural, academic, and weapons embargoes.

“Any Israeli government will not move in a hurry,” said Rynhold. “There are a number of reasons for this — psychologically for the Israeli public, it keeps Hamas further away from the border and also because withdrawal is a hard thing to do.”

Some senior members of Netanyahu’s government have pushed for resettling Gaza with a Jewish population, a position Netanyahu has resisted but one that continues to generate significant international attention and backlash. “As long as Israel won’t allow settlers in, Israel has the ability to shape what goes on there — possibly keeping military control but giving other Palestinian factions civilian control,” Rynhold said.

Israel is set to hold national elections by late October, and the results are expected to significantly shape the future direction of the Gaza situation.

Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militant group in Lebanon, was once considered Israel’s most immediate danger. It joined the fight alongside Hamas just days after the October 7 attack. Israel believed it had nearly defeated Hezbollah by late 2024, but the strategic balance between the two has since shifted again. Iran is now using Hezbollah as a deterrent, threatening to strike Israel if Israel targets its key proxy.

“Israel cannot allow itself to live with that equation,” said Freilich. “This is another failure of its strategy.”

Still, Hezbollah has taken a serious beating. “Hezbollah is infinitely militarily, financially, and politically weaker than it was before October 7,” said Rynhold.

Hezbollah began firing at Israel two days after the joint American-Israeli attack on Iran got underway in March of this year, triggering an Israeli campaign in Lebanon that continued into June. Fighting has slowed since the US-Iran memorandum was announced, but Israeli forces remain in southern Lebanon. Israel has continued striking Hezbollah targets there, deepening its foothold in a zone Hezbollah says should fall under earlier ceasefire terms.

Iran’s threats have made it harder for Israel to strike Hezbollah’s stronghold in the Dahieh neighborhood of Beirut. President Trump reportedly made clear to Netanyahu that any Israeli action there would jeopardize broader efforts to reach an arrangement with Iran. Analysts suggest Hezbollah and Iran may actually emerge from the current situation with more leverage, despite the heavy losses both have suffered.

As Israel approaches nearly three years since October 7, it finds itself in a paradoxical position — militarily powerful yet strategically adrift. Hamas still operates in Gaza, Hezbollah continues to challenge Israel from Lebanon, and Iran has survived and may feel emboldened. With elections approaching, Israel faces a fundamental question: how to turn battlefield success into a lasting and stable regional order.