Israeli military leaders and defense experts find themselves at odds over the scope and duration of operations in southern Lebanon, as ground forces continue reshaping the border region.
The discussion has evolved beyond simply pushing Hezbollah away from Israel’s northern border to considering extended military control of Lebanese territory. With memories of Israel’s previous 18-year presence in the region still fresh, strategists remain split on what measures will actually guarantee security for northern Israeli communities.
Dr. Gabriel Siboni, an IDF reserve colonel and senior researcher at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, advocates for the most comprehensive approach. When Israeli leadership discusses maintaining a security zone until threats are eliminated, Siboni believes the goal should be crystal clear.
“Removing the threat means that Hezbollah does not exist in Lebanon as a military organization with military capabilities,” Siboni explained to The Media Line. His position represents the most aggressive thinking currently influencing Israel’s northern strategy discussions.
This perspective extends far beyond typical military objectives of restoring deterrence or pushing enemies back from borders. Instead, Siboni envisions completely eliminating Hezbollah’s capacity to function as an armed organization within Lebanon.
Regarding territorial control, Siboni’s vision is equally expansive. Israel must maintain a presence in southern Lebanon, he argues, not just along the immediate border area. “My professional view is that we have to stay on the borders of the Litani River, on the Litani River, and in some points on the east side, even beyond the Litani River,” he stated.
Siboni’s stance puts him among the most hawkish voices currently discussing Lebanon policy. However, he frames his argument through military necessity rather than political ambition. He refuses to avoid the term “occupation,” emphasizing that “occupation is a military term” and that operationally, “we need to occupy, to hold the land” until withdrawal becomes feasible.
His proposed campaign would unfold in distinct phases. Initially, Israel would “occupy, to take hold of the area,” followed by what he calls “purifying the area” through destruction of Hezbollah infrastructure. The final phase involves sustained control preventing Hezbollah’s return.
“All these activities take time,” Siboni noted, adding that Israel must remain “until we think that there is no more threat to our northern villages,” meaning Hezbollah loses all military capabilities.
Siboni sees the October 7 attacks as fundamentally changing Israeli strategic thinking. When asked about shifts in northern doctrine, he confirmed the change “in comparison to what was before Oct. 6, 2023.” He explained that Israel’s current security strategy refuses to allow Hezbollah to build northern threats, with a southern Lebanon security zone being one essential component.
Dr. Harel Chorev from Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center offers a more measured perspective. While agreeing that serious action against Hezbollah would require extended, multi-phase operations, he draws clear distinctions between degrading the organization and completely destroying it.
“I don’t think it would be realistic to hope for a full destruction of Hezbollah,” Chorev told The Media Line. This represents a significant departure from Siboni’s maximalist approach.
Chorev’s analysis recognizes Hezbollah as more than just “an Iranian arm,” describing it as “a Shiite Lebanese party, movement, mass movement that represents the desires and motivations of the Shiite sect.” This deeper social and political embedding makes complete eradication far more complex than military rhetoric suggests.
Attempting total destruction would require “the lives of many soldiers” and “an operation that would be extremely expensive, long range, unreasonable in any way,” according to Chorev’s assessment.
Nevertheless, Chorev doesn’t reject the possibility of renewed territorial control. He expects Israel will attempt destroying maximum Hezbollah capabilities while securing “a major part” of southern Lebanon to protect border communities.
However, his vision differs significantly from Siboni’s. “I don’t think it would be in the same pattern as the old security belt,” Chorev explained. “I think it would be something different.” He emphasized that Israel “would love to avoid any stay in Lebanon” but currently sees no viable alternatives.
“None of the Israelis would like a new option of staying in southern Lebanon,” Chorev said. “But the question is always, okay, so what is the alternative?”
Both analysts present renewed Lebanese presence as necessity rather than preference, resulting from strategic failures and post-October 7 intolerance for nearby Hezbollah forces.
Chorev, who served in the 1990s security belt, was particularly emphatic: “No one wants to go back there. They are forcing us to go back there because we cannot bear a situation where Hezbollah and Radwan forces are hanging on our border, threatening our settlements.”
Memories of the previous security zone, which ended with Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal, heavily influence current discussions. Siboni challenges conventional wisdom about that period’s costs.
The earlier presence cost was “not high compared to what we had to pay after October 2023,” Siboni argued, claiming the real strategic failure came when Hezbollah was permitted to rebuild strength.
A future security zone would differ because civilian populations have been relocated northward, eliminating the embedded village environment that complicated previous operations. “Now there will be no population in this area,” Siboni said. “Hopefully, it will be different than before.”
Chorev suggests learning from past mistakes by maintaining mobility rather than static positions, avoiding fixed outposts that make soldiers “sitting ducks.” While acknowledging that effective agreements could eventually allow withdrawal, he remains skeptical based on Hezbollah’s history of using quiet periods for rebuilding.
Both experts reach similar conclusions about Lebanese state capacity but frame them differently. Siboni dismisses possibilities of Lebanese government or military action against Hezbollah by force, concluding that only Israel can dismantle Hezbollah’s capabilities.
Chorev also describes Lebanese government and army as “totally incapable” of military confrontation with Hezbollah. However, he notes recent political shifts in Beirut, including Lebanon’s expulsion of Iranian ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani, as reflecting “shared interest and perception of the conflict with Hezbollah.”
Chorev bluntly observed that as long as Israel doesn’t threaten Lebanon as a state, many Lebanese officials “enjoy it” and “encourage it” because Israel performs “the dirty job for them.”
Siboni viewed the ambassador’s expulsion as significant since “Hezbollah is Iran,” calling Lebanese actions against Hezbollah and Iran meaningful. However, he sees this as supplementary to, not replacement for, Israeli force. He also rejects notions of hypothetical Iranian confrontation: “Iran is involved. We are fighting.”
The analytical differences don’t represent simple hawk-versus-moderate divisions. Both accept that previous northern border deterrence models have failed. Their disagreement centers on achievable objectives rather than whether action is necessary.
Chorev doesn’t envision Hezbollah’s complete military disappearance, while Siboni defines this as the only meaningful outcome. For Siboni, anything less leaves fundamental threats unresolved. For Chorev, such ambitions appear unrealistic, with more credible goals involving maximum operational capacity destruction while physically distancing dangers from Israeli communities.
These differences matter for determining any future Lebanese presence duration and justifying political language. Missions defined as temporary prevention can conclude when threats become manageable. Missions targeting Hezbollah elimination may lack clear endpoints.
For northern Israeli residents, the debate carries immediate rather than theoretical urgency. Siboni acknowledges that even with southern Lebanon control, neutralizing Hezbollah’s short-range threats “will take time,” while longer-range capabilities remain problematic. However, he argues the alternative—another cycle of Hezbollah survival, regrouping, and renewed threats—is worse.
“We need to finish the job with Hezbollah and not leave Hezbollah intact so they can recover,” Siboni stated.
Chorev concluded more soberly: “I don’t think there’s such a thing as final,” warning against definitive closure fantasies. Despite damage, Hezbollah remains functional, decentralized, and capable of coordinated operations. The situation isn’t about Israeli preferences, he noted: “None of us would like to be in it. But they left us no choice.”
Israeli forces are already operating in southern Lebanon and advancing. The ultimate outcome remains undetermined, with IDF scope and duration developing in real-time through field operations.
