
Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis declared Monday they will prohibit vessels connected to Israel from using the Red Sea following Israel’s renewed military operations against Iran, heightening worries about worldwide shipping routes and energy supplies.
The announcement carries significant implications for ongoing regional conflicts and the global energy crisis.
GLOBAL ENERGY MARKET IMPLICATIONS
Since Israel and the United States launched attacks on Iran February 28, Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off most oil and energy shipments from the Gulf region. This action has driven up prices and created a substantial energy crisis worldwide.
In response, Saudi Arabia has rerouted over 70% of its typical daily oil shipments through the Red Sea port of Yanbu.
This alternative route has provided crucial support for energy markets, helping maintain manageable global oil prices.
Any prolonged Houthi interference with Red Sea shipping, including possible strikes on vessels or port facilities, could create serious complications.
A Houthi source informed Reuters that blocking Israeli ships from Red Sea passage represents “a first step” but warned that continued escalation would prompt the group to halt any Israel-bound vessels along with additional actions.
During previous Gaza conflict operations, the group’s stated focus on Israel-connected ships encompassed any vessel owned by companies utilizing Israeli ports, and their attacks effectively deterred most shipping firms from using the waterway.
HOUTHI BACKGROUND
The Houthis developed as a military, political and religious organization in northern Yemen during the 1990s, conducting guerrilla campaigns against the Sanaa government.
They follow the Zaydi branch of Shi’a Islam, and following the 2011 Arab Spring, they built stronger connections with Iran and exploited regional instability to take the capital in 2014, disrupting a Gulf-supported political transition process.
Saudi Arabia and Arab coalition partners initiated military intervention months afterward to reinstate the displaced government and remove a group they viewed as an Iranian proxy, given Riyadh’s primary regional rivalry with Tehran.
As Yemen’s internal conflict reached a deadlock, the Houthis struck oil facilities and other critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates using missiles and drones.
Nevertheless, a 2022 ceasefire agreement between Yemen’s opposing factions has remained mostly intact.
IRANIAN PROXY RELATIONSHIP
Iran supports the Houthis as part of its regional “Axis of Resistance,” which encompasses Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’ite militias, although its connections with the Yemeni organization are less defined than with other affiliated groups.
The Houthis do not acknowledge Iran’s supreme leader as their ultimate religious guide in the manner that Hezbollah and Iraqi factions do. Their primary motivations remain domestic, despite ideological alignment with Iran.
The U.S. maintains that Iran has provided weapons, funding and training to the Houthis with Hezbollah assistance. The Houthis reject claims of being an Iranian proxy and assert they produce their own armaments.
PREVIOUS RED SEA ATTACKS
Following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, assault on Israel and Israel’s extensive Gaza campaign, the Houthis commenced attacks on Israel and international Red Sea shipping, claiming solidarity with Palestinians.
The Houthi Red Sea operations severely interrupted global shipping, forcing Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd and other major carriers to redirect routes around Africa — a considerably longer and costlier alternative.
A U.S.-coordinated effort to restore Red Sea navigation freedom included repeated strikes against Houthi positions and defensive operations that intercepted hundreds of drones and missiles.
However, some Houthi attacks persisted through last summer, concluding entirely only with the Gaza ceasefire in October.
CURRENT CONFLICT INVOLVEMENT
While Hezbollah and Iraqi groups entered the war early with rocket and drone attacks following initial U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, the Houthis have remained relatively inactive.
The group’s leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi stated on March 5: “Our fingers are on the trigger at any moment should developments warrant it.”
Iranian military leadership has consistently warned that the Houthis might enter the conflict, with Revolutionary Guards Quds Force commander Esmaeil Qaani declaring on June 1 they could block the Red Sea.
Prior to this week, the group’s sole participation involved limited missile and drone strikes on Israel during late March and early April.
The reasons for the Houthis’ comparative restraint remain unclear.
They and Iran may have intended to use the possibility of another major energy route blockade to discourage further escalation by Israel and the United States.
The Houthis may also feel less obligation to Iran’s security compared to Tehran’s other regional partners.
Additionally, the group may wish to avoid provoking its powerful, affluent neighbor Saudi Arabia and risking renewed domestic conflict.








