Avalanche specialists are raising serious concerns about the judgment calls made by professional guides during California’s most devastating avalanche disaster in recent memory, which claimed nine lives two months ago.
A detailed assessment released Saturday by the Sierra Avalanche Center and featured on the National Avalanche Center website criticizes the tour guides from Blackbird Mountain Guides for allowing their large group to travel bunched together through hazardous terrain while avalanche alerts were active.
The skiers were moving in a condensed formation when proper protocol demanded they be spread apart to minimize danger, the assessment found.
“Exposing only one person at a time to avalanche terrain is an accepted best practice for backcountry travel,” the report said. “Analysis of past avalanche accidents has indicated that larger group sizes (4 or more people) have higher chances of being caught in avalanches.”
The February 17 disaster struck near Lake Tahoe in California’s Sierra Nevada mountains when an enormous mass of snow crashed down a mountainside, burying nine backcountry skiers while six others managed to survive.
Investigators also discovered that multiple group members carried avalanche safety backpacks with inflatable air bags, yet none of this potentially life-saving gear activated when the slide occurred.
Blackbird Mountain Guides responded Monday that their investigation continues.
“The report does not reflect the full scope of what transpired and does not include all of the facts and information currently under review,” the company stated via email. “We are cooperating fully with authorities and will share more when it is appropriate and based on verified and confirmed findings.”
According to the assessment, the 15-person party was traversing a known avalanche path near Castle Peak after heavy snowfall had created conditions ripe for slides.
While the avalanche center lacks enforcement authority, their reports typically offer crucial safety recommendations for mountain recreation.
Both the Nevada County Sheriff’s Office and state workplace safety officials are conducting separate investigations into the company’s actions before the tragedy.
The avalanche occurred on the final day of a three-day guided tour, as the group chose to cut their trip short and depart from mountain huts to outrun an approaching storm system.
The center’s analysis drew extensively from interviews with survivors Jim Hamilton and Anton Auzans, who shared their experiences with the New York Times. Both men had completed basic avalanche training and possessed limited backcountry skiing experience prior to the fatal outing.
The survivors reported that guides held private discussions, leaving uncertainty about whether the team knew about warnings of highly probable human-triggered avalanches before departing the huts, which had internet connectivity. The men explained that separate women’s and men’s groups were merged that morning under four guides’ supervision.
During the final mile-long ascent, Hamilton encountered equipment problems and lagged behind the main group. Thirteen skiers, predominantly women, remained clustered behind the lead guides as they entered avalanche-prone terrain. Auzans followed closely when the slide struck, according to the newspaper account. Though buried, he successfully freed himself before Hamilton and another guide arrived to attempt rescue operations.
The center acknowledged that other survivors might possess different perspectives and details that could provide a fuller understanding if they decide to share their accounts. The victims included three seasoned guides and six women who belonged to a tight-knit circle of friends with extensive backcountry skiing backgrounds.
Jess Weaver, speaking for the female friends’ group, indicated that survivors and victims’ families are declining media interviews currently.
Colorado avalanche specialist Dale Atkins said the group violated a fundamental principle of mountain travel by remaining clustered while crossing dangerous terrain. However, Atkins noted that staying together in safer areas made logical sense given the day’s poor visibility and the risk of participants becoming separated.
“Did they mess up? A lot of people will say, ‘Yes,’” said Atkins, who brings five decades of Colorado mountain rescue and avalanche research experience. “I’m not so sure about that. You want to keep the group together. But you don’t keep the group together on an avalanche slope. I suspect the guides in the group didn’t realize they were in an avalanche path.”
Atkins offered similar observations about the decision to ski during the storm: While hindsight suggests staying put until conditions improved would have been wiser, the guides may have reasonably believed that rapid evacuation was the safer choice.
“A lot of armchair quarterbacks, if they were in the middle of the storm out there, they might have made a similar decision,” he said. “Tragically for these people and their families, there’s no do over.”
