A former Israeli Defense Forces spokesperson is sounding the alarm that current Middle East ceasefires are providing a false sense of security while hostile groups rebuild their military strength.
Jonathan Conricus, who previously served as an international spokesperson for the IDF and now works as a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, cautioned that existing ceasefire agreements should not be viewed as lasting solutions to regional conflicts.
“I think both sides, all sides, Iran, Israel, various Gulf countries, the Iranian proxies, Hezbollah, everybody is using this time, militarily speaking, in order to resupply and prepare for what probably inevitably is going to come,” Conricus explained in an interview with The Media Line. He believes future hostilities could emerge either locally between Israel and Hezbollah or expand regionally to include Israel, Iran, and the United States.
During ongoing questions about President Donald Trump’s ceasefire initiatives, Conricus emphasized that Israel and its opponents are exploiting the current lull to strengthen their military arsenals. “Gulf states are frantically trying to improve their defensive capabilities, and Israel is replenishing all of the stockpiles, both offensive and defensive ones,” he noted. “And I think that the Iranian regime is trying to do the same in order to try to brace themselves for whatever will come.”
Regarding diplomatic efforts with Iran, Conricus expressed pessimism about potential breakthroughs. “The negotiations, they look like two parallel lines that are not going to meet,” he stated, explaining that “the maximum that the Iranian regime is willing to address doesn’t meet the very basic minimum that the US is willing to consider.” He emphasized that Iran lacks the leverage to “be dictating terms,” citing the country’s vulnerability to economic sanctions and infrastructure damage.
While discussing Iran’s current military capabilities, Conricus avoided declaring the regime completely neutralized. “The Iranian regime is down, but it’s definitely not out,” he observed. Although Iran’s capacity “to project force,” produce ballistic missiles and drones, and serve as “the bully of the region” has been “significantly reduced,” it has “not permanently destroyed.”
“If the regime is left in place, then I have very little doubt that what we will eventually see within a relatively short period of time would be the Iranian regime going back to what they did before,” he predicted, identifying nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, drones, and terrorism support as probable focus areas. “There’s no indication … that the Iranian regime is changing its trajectory,” he concluded.
Addressing the situation in Lebanon, Conricus argued that calling the current arrangement a “ceasefire” misrepresents actual conditions. “We have a ceasefire on paper, but it isn’t really a ceasefire in the way that I would interpret the phrase, whereby both sides of a conflict cease their military operations,” he explained. Israel continues operating “to defend Israeli civilians in northern Israel” and weaken Hezbollah’s capabilities, while Hezbollah maintains rocket and drone attacks and engages Israeli forces stationed in Lebanon.
According to Conricus, Israel appears to be honoring American requests only by restraining major strikes against Hezbollah’s strategic infrastructure in Beirut and the Beqaa Valley. “In that … we have a certain aspect of a ceasefire,” he acknowledged. However, he maintained that the fundamental problem remains Hezbollah’s presence as an armed Iranian proxy within Lebanon.
“What really needs to happen here is for a strategic decision to be made by the Lebanese government,” he argued. “That is to make sure that there’s only one military in Lebanon, and that is the military of the state of Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces.” Without this change, Conricus predicted Israel and Lebanon will continue experiencing “various aspects of ceasefires and violations of ceasefire and fighting and attacks and moving population and many other things.”
When asked about the Litani River’s strategic importance, Conricus dismissed its significance. “I don’t think that the Litani River holds any strategic significance,” he said. He suggested Israel should prioritize cutting connections between Iran and Hezbollah and blocking Hezbollah’s access to weapons.
“The ability to achieve our long-term goals using military only are very limited,” he admitted. “Military are necessary, but they are not the ones that will actually deliver what Israel needs on a long-term security perspective.” He recommended Israel employ military, diplomatic, financial, and non-kinetic approaches while supporting Lebanon’s government and army.
Conricus stressed that any Lebanese agreement will remain ineffective unless Beirut directly confronts Hezbollah. “Until we see the Lebanese government order the Lebanese armed forces to take meaningful kinetic military action against Hezbollah, action that would also entail casualties on the Lebanese side, then everything said and done will be void and of very little relevance,” he declared.
He suggested that once Lebanese authorities take such action, “then we know that they crossed the Rubicon.” At that point, he recommended Israel provide “maximum support, intelligence, and kinetic support and diplomatic support,” while avoiding actions that would complicate the Lebanese government’s domestic efforts.
Turning to Gaza, Conricus noted that Hamas maintains control over areas beyond Israeli military presence. “If we’re honest about it, Hamas controls half of the Gaza Strip,” he stated. “Is it a robust, functioning, and well-oiled bureaucracy? No, it’s jungle laws.” He characterized Hamas governance as “the survival of the fittest and the rule of the most cruel and violent,” adding that Hamas “still has weapons, and still controls the Palestinian civilian population.”
Conricus expressed no surprise at Hamas’ refusal to surrender weapons. “Hamas was never going to disarm,” he said. “The only way to disarm Hamas is to defeat them.” He described this process as lengthy and politically challenging. “This is not a quick fix. This doesn’t align with American or Israeli political calendars,” he warned.
Regarding Hamas’ tunnel infrastructure, Conricus noted increased caution in official Israeli evaluations. “The last assessment I heard was something to the tune of 60%,” he mentioned, referring to reported Hamas infrastructure destruction. “But I take that with many grains of salt and with caution, because I think that the gap between what we know and what we don’t know is still significant.”
He explained that certain Gaza areas remain beyond Israeli troop access, while zones within Israel’s deployment area undergo systematic searches and clearance. “It’s a spider web of underground network,” he described. “It appears almost endless in terms of the amount, depth, and diversity of tunnels that Hamas dug over so many years.”
Conricus recommended similar caution when evaluating Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas capabilities. “We’ve seen many times with the benefit of hindsight that what Intel assessments provided, they were perhaps a bit more optimistic than reality.”
For Conricus, the key insight across all three conflict zones is that incomplete military damage does not equal strategic victory. “Until you are able to force an enemy to surrender and give up and capitulate, it doesn’t really matter how much of his assets you’ve been able to degrade,” he concluded. “Whether you destroy 40%, 60% or 70 or 80%, it is important, but it is not decisive and crucial.”
