Maritime traffic through the strategically crucial Strait of Hormuz continues to operate at severely reduced levels, with vessel movement dropping to single digits despite the recent ceasefire brokered by President Donald Trump and accepted by Israel.
According to Noam Raydan, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, current data reveals that shipping activity through the waterway remains “still very weak” with “at least five to six vessels” moving in both directions. This represents a significant decline from earlier in April, when vessel counts reached double digits before current restrictions took effect. “We were still seeing around between like 10 and 15 vessels,” Raydan explained. “But now it’s back down to single digit.”
The expert emphasized that the reduced numbers only tell part of the story, noting that remaining activity doesn’t represent typical maritime operations. “This is not normal flow,” she stated. “We’re not seeing a kind of healthy movement of ships, non-Iranian vessels.”
This maritime crisis has emerged as political leaders debate long-term solutions. Just days before the ceasefire announcement, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu renewed discussions about redirecting Gulf oil exports toward Mediterranean routes, reviving proposals that have remained stalled for years. Meanwhile, President Trump had concentrated on immediate reopening efforts and establishing deadlines for further action.
Current conditions at sea reveal the ongoing severity of the situation. Raydan described observing unusual vessel behavior, stating: “At least one ship we saw making a U-turn in the Gulf of Oman and returning back to the Strait of Hormuz,” which demonstrates “some effectiveness to the blockade.” However, she cautioned against drawing definitive conclusions, explaining: “As long as we are dealing with these dark activities, it is really difficult to give a full assessment.”
The uncertainty extends throughout maritime operations in the region. Some Iranian-linked vessels continue entering the Persian Gulf from areas near the United Arab Emirates and Oman, while “some ships are turning off their AIS” (Automatic Identification System). Raydan also noted at least one vessel that stopped transmitting signals in the Gulf of Oman and hasn’t resumed communication.
Rather than complete closure or reopening, the situation presents complex operational challenges. “You need to look at case by case,” Raydan explained. “You cannot just say, yes, it’s working. No, it’s not working. It doesn’t work like that.”
Iranian authorities aren’t characterizing these conditions as temporary measures. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has referenced what they term a “new Persian Gulf order” and indicated the strait won’t return to previous operational status. This messaging aligns with observable traffic patterns showing limited resumed movement under fundamentally altered conditions.
For shipping companies, these challenges create immediate operational problems. Raydan referenced comments from a Western European shipping firm whose vessels remain immobilized due to persistent uncertainty about risk levels.
“It’s very unclear to them what the security situation is, what the security guarantees are,” she said. “Will Iran attack? What about the mines?” While acknowledging she lacks concrete mine data and stressing that reports don’t constitute confirmed operational intelligence, Raydan noted that uncertainty alone prevents normal operations. “The operational environment for the shipping industry” continues to be “very volatile,” she said. “There are risks. They need to take them into consideration.”
This uncertainty translates into widespread immobilization. “We’re talking about hundreds of ships, thousands of seafarers,” she said. “They’re just stuck in the Persian Gulf.” Vessels face stark choices: “You wouldn’t expect ships to just decide to sail without coordinating with Iran,” she explained. “Either they coordinate, they work with Iran, meaning reach out to Iran, or probably they might be forced to pay, or they just don’t leave.”
These conditions raise questions about potential alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz. Prof. Eyal Zisser, vice rector of Tel Aviv University and scholar of Syrian, Lebanese, and broader Arab politics, told The Media Line that renewed interest in alternatives reflects genuine shifts in Gulf state perspectives, though not in their practical limitations.
“First of all, we need to wait and see what will be the end, the point where the war will be ended,” he said. “But clearly, Iran became a source of threat. I mean, it was well known, but this time it was materialized.” This represents the fundamental change he identifies.
The threat has evolved from theoretical possibility to present reality, making alternative route exploration inevitable. “I think they will have to find alternatives,” he said. “And there are alternatives, and they will start, but it takes time.”
When asked about the feasibility of current proposals, Zisser provided a direct assessment: “It will take years.” He added a crucial caveat that challenges much public discussion: “And still the Iranians can hit those installations. So, it’s not very easy.”
Vita Avrahamov, a researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security specializing in geopolitics, economics, and energy issues, provided quantitative analysis supporting these concerns. “There is no immediate solution that can fully replace the energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz,” she told The Media Line.
Her calculations show the strait typically handles approximately 20 million barrels of oil daily, while existing alternatives can manage only 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day, representing roughly 17 to 27 percent of that capacity.
“These options are viable as strategic diversification, but not as a full bypass solution,” she explained. Avrahamov outlined three primary alternative directions. The Red Sea route through Saudi infrastructure represents “the most immediately viable” option, though still limited. “Saudi Arabia’s exports through the Red Sea … is only a partial solution and cannot fully replace exports through the Strait of Hormuz,” she said, citing constraints including “limited loading capacity available at the Yanbu export terminal.”
Mediterranean routes, including potential connections through Israel or revived Iraq-Turkey pathways toward Ceyhan or Haifa, “offer shorter access to European markets but face substantial geopolitical barriers.” Routes toward Oman and the Arabian Sea are “politically more neutral and strategically attractive” but would require massive new investments in pipelines, ports, logistics networks, and secure transit arrangements. Her conclusion: “none currently offers a comprehensive or politically frictionless alternative to Hormuz.”
Raydan offered an even more definitive assessment: “Nothing can substitute the Strait of Hormuz.” While acknowledging existing contingency plans, including “pipelines like the one in Saudi Arabia, the east-west pipeline to the Red Sea, which has definitely been leveraged in order to push volumes and bypass the Strait of Hormuz” and noting that “UAE also has a pipeline,” she challenged how these options are presented in public discourse.
“Let’s be honest,” she said. “We cannot replace, these pipelines cannot replace the flows out of the Strait of Hormuz.”
She quantified the scale of what’s at stake: “We’re talking about an average loading of some 20 million barrels per day,” referring to the January to early March period before current conflicts. “We need to be realistic here,” she said. “You can have contingency plans like pipelines, but let’s not pretend.”
Her frustration with current reporting became evident: “I’ve been seeing a lot of reports about it, that Strait of Hormuz can be substituted and that land routes can substitute sea lanes. It doesn’t work like that.”
This analysis provides important context for political discussions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. According to Raydan, the core issue is being mischaracterized when quickly transformed into infrastructure debates. “It’s more an issue of maritime security,” she emphasized, describing this as “a key topic that requires the full focus right now, maritime security, the principle of freedom of navigation,” which will remain “a key subject in the region for years to come.”
Zisser offered similar perspective when challenging recent political statements: “Sometimes these statements do not have anything to do with reality.” Later, when asked what the public might be overlooking, he was more direct: “Sometimes… statements by politicians are more wishful thinking than has to do with reality.”
Avrahamov framed it in technical terms but reached comparable conclusions. Large-scale alternatives require “substantial capital investment, long development timelines, and credible security guarantees,” with feasibility remaining limited by “enduring geopolitical fragmentation.”
The immediate reality isn’t that new networks stand ready to replace Hormuz operations. Instead, the route that continues handling regional oil exports operates under degraded, highly uncertain conditions, while frequently cited public alternatives remain either partial, politically challenging, or years from implementation.
While the ceasefire has reduced tensions, it hasn’t resolved operational conditions in the strait. Raydan’s assessment remains most accurate: traffic is “still very weak,” non-Iranian vessel movement isn’t healthy, ships remain stranded, and the entire situation can’t be resolved through pipeline rhetoric. For now, Hormuz continues as the primary system in use—just a system operating under significant stress. As Raydan concluded: “Nothing can substitute the Strait of Hormuz.”
