WASHINGTON — The Trump administration is moving to submit a nuclear technology sharing agreement with Saudi Arabia to Congress, and according to two sources familiar with the matter, the deal is missing key protections that the United States has historically required to prevent nuclear materials from being diverted into weapons programs.
The document, referred to as a 123 Agreement — named after Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 — must be in place before the U.S. government and American companies can assist Saudi Arabia in building out a multibillion-dollar civilian nuclear industry. The agreement is expected to be signed by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi energy minister Abdulaziz bin Salman, who signed a preliminary version of the deal in Riyadh last year.
The White House and the U.S. Department of Energy did not respond to requests for comment.
According to the sources, the agreement does not include what is known as the “Gold Standard” — a provision that would prevent Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, both of which can serve as pathways toward developing nuclear weapons. The United Arab Emirates accepted this Gold Standard when it signed its own 123 Agreement with Washington back in 2009.
The deal also reportedly leaves out the “Additional Protocol,” which gives the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency expanded authority to monitor a country’s nuclear activities, including the ability to conduct surprise inspections at sites that have not been officially declared. The sources spoke anonymously due to the sensitive nature of the discussions.
One source indicated the administration could submit the agreement to Congress as early as Wednesday, while another suggested the timeline was closer to a week away. A third source, who did not address the safeguards question, confirmed the submission was coming soon.
Energy Secretary Wright had previously stated that the preliminary agreement was not focused on enrichment and met all nonproliferation standards contained in the Atomic Energy Act, which he described as among the strongest in the world. One source clarified that while the agreement creates a legal avenue for cooperation on the nuclear fuel cycle — which includes uranium enrichment — it does not require the United States to actually hand over any related technology or capabilities to Saudi Arabia.
The deal has drawn significant concern from arms control advocates and members of Congress. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated in a 2018 CBS interview that “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” The kingdom has also repeatedly asserted its desire to retain the right to enrich uranium on its own soil.
Once submitted, Congress has approximately 90 days of continuous legislative sessions to raise objections. If no action is taken, the agreement automatically takes effect. Blocking it would require both chambers to pass a joint resolution — and a two-thirds majority would be needed to override a presidential veto.
Opposition to a deal without safeguards has come from many Democrats and some Republicans. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, during his time as a U.S. senator, was among those who insisted any such agreement include strong protective guardrails.
