The standoff over the Strait of Hormuz has shifted away from military confrontation and into the realm of diplomatic language — where the precise meaning of a few carefully chosen words could determine who ultimately controls one of the globe’s most vital shipping corridors.
At the center of the dispute is not an outright toll provision, but a collection of ambiguous phrases: a “no charge” clause covering 60 days in a US-Iran memorandum, references to “maritime services” and “associated costs” in a joint statement between Oman and Iran, and Washington’s firm position that the strait cannot become a passage requiring permission from any single nation.
Following talks in Muscat that included Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq of Oman, and Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, Oman and Iran released a joint statement backing the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between Washington and Tehran. The statement identified Oman and Iran as the two coastal nations bordering the Strait of Hormuz, called for safe passage consistent with international law, and underscored both nations’ sovereignty over their territorial waters.
The statement’s most contentious section announced that Oman and Iran would continue discussions through a joint foreign ministry working group aimed at reaching an agreement on the future management of navigation through the strait, the services to be offered, and the costs connected to those services. The two countries also said they would seek input from other coastal nations in the region.
Notably, the statement never uses the word “tolls.” However, by referencing services and costs, it opens the door to debate over where a toll ends and a maritime service charge, safety fee, or administrative cost begins.
The US-Iran memorandum, as described by a senior US official and published by Arab Center Washington DC, takes a similarly cautious approach. It states that Iran will make its “best efforts” to ensure safe passage for commercial ships “with no charge, for 60 days only,” traveling between the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman in either direction. It also calls for Iran to engage in dialogue with Oman to define future administration and maritime services in the strait, in coordination with other Gulf coastal states and in accordance with international law.
The three parties are reading these documents very differently. Washington interprets “no charge” to mean no tolls, no fees, no insurance costs, and no Iranian-run payment system. Tehran appears to view the language as leaving space for future negotiations over maritime services and their associated costs. Oman’s position is more balanced, weaving together safe passage, international law, coastal-state sovereignty, regional consultation, and a working group process.
Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, cautioned against reading the Oman-Iran discussions as an immediate decision to charge ships for passage.
“Unlike some reporting, they are not announcing that they will collect tolls,” Parsi told The Media Line. He said the two countries were instead laying the groundwork for “future navigation” of the strait and the “services” to be provided, along with the cost of those services.
In Parsi’s assessment, the Oman-Iran statement signals negotiations over how the strait will be governed once the 60-day window closes — not an immediate imposition of charges. He also pointed out that the statement calls for consultations with other coastal states, suggesting an effort to make management of the strait “a regional affair” rather than something handled solely by Iran and Oman.
The legal framing carries significant political weight. A unilateral Iranian charge on vessels transiting Hormuz would be viewed in Washington as a direct challenge to freedom of navigation. But a regional maritime safety framework involving Oman, Iran, and other Gulf coastal states gives Tehran a more defensible position — framing the discussion as one about sovereignty, safety, and administration rather than coercive control. US officials remain concerned that even this softer approach could allow Iran to use its geographic position as leverage.
US Department of State adviser Willian I., who asked to be identified only by first name and last initial, said the conflicting accounts reflect deliberate political messaging rather than simple diplomatic misunderstanding.
“What we’re seeing isn’t confusion, it’s two governments performing for two different domestic and international audiences at the same time. Iran has to prove to its own hard-liners, especially the Revolutionary Guard, that it didn’t capitulate. Washington has to prove to its own public that it won, that the strait is open, and that the pressure campaign worked. Both narratives can’t be fully true simultaneously, so we get contradictory statements almost daily, and that gap is where disinformation thrives,” Willian I. told The Media Line.
The same text is being used to serve different political purposes. Washington wants to present the arrangement as evidence that the strait is reopening without tolls or Iranian conditions attached. Tehran, on the other hand, needs to avoid looking like it accepted a US-dictated framework or gave up its claim to a role in managing the waterway.
That leaves the most difficult question for a later date: who, if anyone, will have the authority to attach costs to passage through Hormuz once the 60-day period ends.
Willian I. acknowledged that a formal assurance on tolls exists, but warned against treating it as politically permanent.
“On the tolls, I can say this with confidence: Iran has given a direct, head-of-state-level assurance that there will be no toll. That commitment exists. But you have to separate the official channel from the fake news; there’s a faction within the IRGC actively spreading conflicting signals to undermine the negotiations, and Iranian positions on this have shifted quickly before. So the guarantee is real, but it’s fragile, and it would be naive to treat any single statement from Tehran as final,” he said.
That assessment aligns with the US government’s public position that Iran has assured Washington it is not pursuing tolls or other charges. Still, the practical details remain unsettled. The documents do not define what qualifies as a “service,” who provides it, who sets the price, whether payments would be voluntary or mandatory, or whether any payment mechanism would involve Iranian-linked institutions or security forces.
The longer-term challenge is political and strategic, not just financial. The Strait of Hormuz is not an ordinary shipping lane. It is a narrow chokepoint through which a significant portion of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas flows. Even modest uncertainty over transit rights, naval authority, registration requirements, insurance obligations, or administrative fees can ripple out to affect shipping markets, energy prices, and military positioning across the Gulf region.
Willian I. said the toll dispute is really part of a broader argument over who holds authority in the strait.
“There’s a second, distinct issue people are conflating with the toll story: Iran and Oman are jointly exploring a future framework to administer the strait, built on the claim that those waters fall under their sovereignty. That’s a different fight, about control, not just money, and it’s one Washington will not accept, now or later. The US has made clear it will not tolerate any arrangement that lets Iran convert a strategic chokepoint into a permission-based corridor,” he said.
For Washington, that is the line it will not cross. The United States can accept de-escalation language, a temporary reopening of the strait, Omani mediation, and even a regional consultation mechanism. What it cannot accept is any arrangement that effectively gives Tehran veto power over commercial shipping or creates a payment system that acknowledges Iranian authority over transit.
The Oman-Iran statement attempts to balance those competing pressures. It invokes safe passage and freedom of navigation, but also stresses sovereignty and sovereign rights. It references international standards, but leaves undefined who will determine what services are provided and what they cost. It calls for consultations with other regional states, but starts with a bilateral Oman-Iran working group.
That structure allows Oman to function as both a mediator and a coastal state, while giving Tehran language it can use domestically to argue that it has not surrendered the strait as a strategic asset.
A similar gap between public language and unresolved implementation appears in the nuclear dimension of the US-Iran process. The framework also addresses Iran’s nuclear program, enriched material, and oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Washington has characterized the arrangement as a path toward inspections and nuclear restraint. Iranian public messaging has been more guarded, focusing on principles rather than specifics.
“Yes, Iran has agreed in principle to allow the nuclear agency to visit, that much is confirmed. What hasn’t been confirmed is any detail of how, where, or when, because those details don’t exist yet. My read is that this is a stalling tactic. Iran’s strategic objective hasn’t changed: it still wants the capability to be feared on the world stage. Fully abandoning the weapons track would be read, both internationally and by the regime’s own hard-line base, as a humiliating defeat. No Iranian government survives that politically,” Willian I. said.
The same political constraints apply to the Hormuz situation. Iran may be willing to accept language that eases immediate pressure, restores shipping traffic, and keeps negotiations going. But publicly conceding that it has no future role in the strait, no ability to shape maritime services, and no leverage over passage would be a much harder sell for a leadership trying to frame the outcome as a win rather than a retreat.
“There’s a pattern here worth naming directly: authoritarian regimes don’t publicly concede. Iran is not going to announce that it’s accepting UN inspectors unconditionally, abandoning its programs, or fully relinquishing control of the strait, even if, behind closed doors, that’s exactly the direction things are moving. No head of state admits he’s losing a war. A dictatorship admits it even less. Every public statement coming out of Tehran right now needs to be read as messaging for an internal audience first, fact second,” Willian I. said.
Even so, the language around “services” and “costs” leaves a narrow but meaningful opening for future conflict. Iran can argue it is not charging a toll but seeking compensation for safety, navigation, environmental, or administrative services. Washington can counter that any mandatory payment tied to passage is simply a toll under a different name. Oman can maintain that the matter must be resolved through international law and coastal-state consultation. Shipping companies, insurers, and Gulf nations will ultimately have to judge whether the emerging framework reduces risk or introduces a new kind of uncertainty.
The weeks ahead will reveal whether the US-Iran ceasefire framework can hold together despite the gap between public narratives and the operational details that still need to be worked out.
If the final arrangement preserves safe, open, and charge-free navigation, Washington will declare its pressure campaign a success. If it gives Iran and Oman a path to define services and costs in ways that change the practical rules of passage, Tehran will claim it turned a military crisis into a new regional governance structure.
The Strait of Hormuz is open — at least in the language of diplomatic documents. Whether it stays open in legal, commercial, and strategic terms is the question that remains unanswered.
