The Horn of Africa is rapidly becoming an extension of Middle Eastern geopolitical strategy, as governments on opposite shores of the Red Sea expand their footprint through military deals, port investments, energy projects, and diplomatic alliances.
Egypt recently signed a maritime cooperation agreement with Somalia, while Turkey has built a sweeping military, economic, and institutional presence there — all while maintaining close ties with Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia is growing its defense and maritime relationship with Mogadishu, and the United Arab Emirates has poured significant money into port development, most notably at Berbera in Somaliland.
Israel’s decision to formally recognize Somaliland has added a new diplomatic layer with potential security consequences, given Somaliland’s position along the Gulf of Aden. Sudan, meanwhile, stands as the starkest example of how foreign competition can deepen a country’s internal crisis.
Dr. Aly Tarek Metwally, a political affairs and regional security analyst, described the region’s growing importance to The Media Line: “The Horn of Africa has emerged as one of the most strategically significant regions in contemporary international politics. Positioned at the intersection of Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, the region has become a focal point where maritime security, international trade, geopolitical competition and regional diplomacy increasingly converge.”
Shiri Fein-Grossman, CEO of the Israel-Africa Relations Institute and former head of regional affairs at Israel’s National Security Council, echoed that view. “The Horn of Africa has become one of the principal intersections between African, Middle Eastern and global geopolitics,” she told The Media Line. “Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Iran and Israel all have growing interests in the region, alongside China, the United States, the European Union and others.”
Those interests span maritime security, trade, energy, infrastructure, food security, and diplomacy.
A Shared Strategic Arena
Any vessel traveling between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean must pass through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait before continuing toward the Suez Canal. That route is critical to world commerce but has grown increasingly vulnerable to conflict, piracy, and attacks launched from Yemen.
Middle Eastern nations have long had ties to the Horn, but the scale of involvement and the degree to which events in the Middle East now influence alignments on the African side of the Red Sea have grown significantly.
“Developments in the Horn of Africa can no longer be viewed in isolation from the wider strategic environment of the Red Sea and the Middle East,” Metwally said. “They form part of an interconnected regional security landscape in which stability, economic prosperity and international navigation are mutually dependent.”
Israel Recognizes Somaliland
On December 26, 2025, Israel became the first — and so far only — United Nations member state to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign nation. Somalia condemned the move as an assault on its sovereignty. Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, and the African Union all reaffirmed their backing for Somalia’s territorial integrity.
Somaliland has operated as a self-governing territory since 1991, with its own institutions, security forces, and political system, though Somalia continues to claim it as part of its own territory.
For Israel, geography is a driving factor. Somaliland’s coastline faces Yemen across the Gulf of Aden and sits near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait — placing the relationship at the center of Israeli concerns about Red Sea shipping and the Houthi threat.
“Israel’s recognition of Somaliland should be understood as the convergence of diplomatic, security and economic considerations,” Fein-Grossman said. She highlighted Somaliland’s relative stability, functioning governmental institutions, and interest in long-term international partnerships. “At the same time, its location on the Gulf of Aden, opposite Yemen and adjacent to the Bab-el-Mandeb, gives it exceptional strategic importance,” she added.
Somaliland’s defense minister confirmed in June that Israel was helping train some police and military personnel, while denying that the two sides were negotiating an Israeli military base. Somaliland has also promoted potential cooperation with Israel in agriculture, water, renewable energy, healthcare, and technology.
Egypt takes a firmly different stance, grounding its position in the defense of internationally recognized borders. “Central to Egypt’s regional policy is its unwavering commitment to the principles of territorial integrity and respect for the sovereignty of states,” Metwally said, calling those principles core pillars of both the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
Fein-Grossman said Israel should manage its disagreements with regional actors through ongoing dialogue with Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi rather than expecting a unified regional response.
The UAE’s Port Investment at Berbera
Alongside Israel’s diplomatic moves, the UAE has long maintained a commercial presence in Somaliland centered on Berbera. Dubai-based DP World, an Emirati multinational logistics firm, has pledged up to $442 million in a phased plan to develop Berbera Port, an adjacent economic zone, and a transport corridor linking Somaliland’s coast with Ethiopia and the broader Horn of Africa.
That investment secures the UAE a long-term commercial foothold near one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and bolsters Somaliland’s economic standing despite its limited international recognition.
For landlocked Ethiopia, Berbera offers a potential alternative to its heavy reliance on Djibouti for maritime trade. For Somaliland, the port brings revenue, employment, and a platform to attract further outside investment.
“Berbera has the potential to become one of the Horn of Africa’s most important logistics and commercial gateways, serving not only Somaliland but also landlocked Ethiopia and the wider region,” Fein-Grossman said.
While Emirati investment and Israeli recognition are not necessarily coordinated, the UAE’s commercial activity has strengthened Somaliland’s position and increased Berbera’s relevance to Israeli calculations about Red Sea security. Notably, the UAE has not formally recognized Somaliland as a state.
Egypt and Somalia Strengthen Ties
Somalia’s cabinet approved a maritime cooperation agreement with Egypt on July 9, covering transport, ports, and the development of Somali maritime infrastructure. The deal follows a broader expansion of bilateral relations that includes defense cooperation and Egypt’s proposed participation in African Union peace-support operations in Somalia.
Cairo views the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb as a strategic extension of the Suez Canal. Egypt’s policy is also shaped by its long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its opposition to any moves that could undermine Somalia’s territorial integrity.
“For Egypt, engagement in the Horn of Africa is not driven by aspirations for regional influence but by an enduring commitment to safeguarding regional stability,” Metwally said, noting that Cairo has long viewed the Horn and the Red Sea as a natural extension of its strategic environment.
The agreement, he said, goes beyond technical port cooperation — it forms part of a broader strategic partnership aimed at strengthening Somali institutions, maritime security, and economic development.
The Egyptian-Somali relationship is also viewed in the context of Ethiopia’s January 2024 memorandum with Somaliland, which sparked a sharp dispute with Mogadishu. Turkey later brokered a reconciliation through the Ankara Declaration, with both governments reaffirming respect for sovereignty and agreeing to explore arrangements that could give Ethiopia sea access under Somali sovereign authority.
Turkey Balances Somalia and Ethiopia
Turkey has developed one of the most extensive Middle Eastern presences in the Horn of Africa. Its engagement with Somalia started with humanitarian aid and grew to encompass defense, infrastructure, education, healthcare, aviation, trade, and energy. Turkey runs a major military training facility in Mogadishu and signed a defense and economic cooperation agreement with Somalia in 2024 that includes maritime security assistance.
At the same time, Ankara has maintained significant political and economic ties with Ethiopia — a balancing act that positioned it to mediate after the Somaliland agreement fractured relations between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa.
“Turkey is one of the most significant external actors in the Horn of Africa, but its engagement should be understood within the context of a much broader, decades-long Africa strategy,” Fein-Grossman said.
Through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, the Maarif Foundation, Turkish Airlines, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, business associations, and a growing diplomatic network, Ankara has built relationships that reach well beyond military or government-to-government contacts.
Saudi Arabia Deepens Its Somali Partnership
Saudi Arabia has also ramped up its engagement with Somalia. The two countries signed a military cooperation agreement in Riyadh on February 9, 2026, followed later that month by a separate agreement on maritime transport and port development.
Saudi interests are rooted in Somalia’s position directly across from the Arabian Peninsula, the need to protect Red Sea shipping lanes, and concerns about instability spreading from Yemen and the broader Horn. Riyadh has backed Somalia’s territorial integrity, putting it closer to Egypt and Turkey than to Israel on the Somaliland question.
Fein-Grossman cautioned against framing Saudi or Egyptian engagement as a reaction to Israel, noting that both nations have operated in the Red Sea and the Horn for decades based on their own geographic, trade, food security, and regional political interests.
Sudan: A Warning to the Region
Sudan offers the most damaging example of what happens when Middle Eastern rivalries become entangled in a domestic war. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are widely seen as aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces. The UAE has repeatedly been accused by United Nations experts and American lawmakers of backing the rival Rapid Support Forces — accusations Abu Dhabi denies.
Those divisions have fed into a broader Saudi-Emirati rivalry that extends across Yemen, Somalia, and the Red Sea, even as both Gulf governments continue participating in diplomatic efforts to end Sudan’s conflict.
“The experience of Sudan offers an important lesson for the wider region,” Metwally said. “Local conflicts can become considerably more complex when regional rivalries overlap with domestic political crises.”
African Governments Are Active Players
Framing the Horn of Africa purely as a battleground for foreign powers risks portraying Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Sudan as passive bystanders. In reality, each is actively pursuing its own interests. Somalia is broadening its economic and security partnerships while defending its territorial claims. Ethiopia is working to reduce its dependence on Djibouti. Somaliland is leveraging Berbera, its institutions, and its geographic position to attract recognition and investment.
“African governments are not passive participants in this process,” Fein-Grossman said. “They actively shape the strategic environment, diversify their partnerships and choose the relationships that best advance their national interests.”
She also cautioned that debates about ports, bases, and strategic rivalry often lose sight of the people most affected. “The people of Somaliland, like people across Africa, seek peace, opportunity, education, healthcare, investment and the ability to build a better future for the next generation,” she said.
Metwally similarly argued that international partnerships can genuinely support development and stronger institutions only when they respect local ownership and sovereign decision-making.
The moves by Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE across the Horn of Africa are not isolated events. Together they reflect a broad strategic realignment stretching from the Suez Canal and the Arabian Peninsula through the Bab-el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and into the Indian Ocean. Whether that realignment leads to cooperative security or deepening rivalry will depend as much on African governments’ ability to retain control over their own futures as on the ambitions of the outside powers involved.
