A new framework brokered by Washington between Israel and Lebanon has been signed, but it sits within a broader regional landscape that remains unstable, contradictory, and far from resolved.
The United States is simultaneously pursuing two diplomatic tracks. One involves a preliminary memorandum of understanding with Iran — giving both sides 60 days to hammer out final terms covering nuclear restrictions, sanctions relief, Strait of Hormuz provisions, and language aimed at halting hostilities across the region, including Lebanon. On a separate track, Washington has tied Israel’s gradual pullback from Lebanese territory to the confirmed disarmament of Hezbollah and the restoration of Lebanon’s exclusive authority over its own armed forces.
These two diplomatic efforts are not aligned. They reveal a central tension in American regional strategy. The US-Iran track could open economic doors for Tehran, while the Israel-Lebanon framework is designed to cut off money, weapons, and political support to Hezbollah. One approach treats Iran as a partner in de-escalation. The other essentially pushes Tehran out of Lebanon’s political equation and reframes Hezbollah not as a resistance movement, but as the primary obstacle to both Lebanese sovereignty and Israeli security.
The Israel-Lebanon framework, signed in Washington, lays out a step-by-step process. Lebanon’s military is expected to take charge in two initial “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah’s infrastructure would be dismantled and Lebanese civilians allowed to return under state control. If successful, the model would expand to other areas. A security annex — not yet made public — is believed to spell out the operational specifics.
The agreement also signals a broader political shift. Rather than simply seeking calm along the border, it addresses Lebanese sovereignty, the disarming of nonstate armed groups, blocking reconstruction funds from reaching armed factions, and establishing working groups aimed at a future comprehensive peace deal. For Lebanon, the text cuts to the heart of the country’s most sensitive modern political question: whether the Lebanese state — and not Hezbollah — holds the sole authority to decide on war and peace. For Israel, the concern is whether any withdrawal can be trusted given that previous agreements were signed but never fully carried out.
Sarit Zehavi, founder and president of Alma Center, said the most critical part of the agreement may be the section that has not been released to the public.
“It’s an MOU, so not all details are published. It seems like there is another part of the agreement that was not published, which is the security part,” Zehavi told The Media Line.
She noted that the pilot-zone mechanism still lacks clarity — specifically whether the Israel Defense Forces, the Lebanese Armed Forces, or both would be tasked with removing Hezbollah’s infrastructure from those areas.
From Zehavi’s standpoint, the framework’s key advancement is that Israeli withdrawal is no longer contingent on Lebanese promises alone, but on verified, concrete actions.
“I think the positive development of this agreement, with regard to the pilot zone, is the fact that there is an understanding that Israel is withdrawing only under proven actions of disarmament in Lebanon,” she said. “This was not the case in the two previous agreements that we had in 2006 and in 2024. In both cases, we had withdrawn based on a Lebanese promise that was never fulfilled. This time, it’s exactly the opposite.”
That sequencing is also where Israeli doubts take root. The deal hinges not just on the Lebanese army moving into areas the IDF vacates, but on ensuring Hezbollah cannot return alongside the civilian population. For communities in northern Israel — many still bearing the scars of prolonged fighting — this is the ultimate test.
“It is clear that it’s for the Lebanese army to make sure that Hezbollah is not coming back with the civilians,” Zehavi said. “Israel will not withdraw completely if it does not have proof that any area that was evacuated by the IDF is not being used for Hezbollah to come back. That’s the main achievement from the Israeli point of view.”
Zehavi also views the framework as something more politically significant than a standard ceasefire arrangement.
“The second achievement, which works for both sides, I think, is the fact that there is mutual recognition in the very existence of the State of Israel,” she said. “And the idea is that it’s an MOU for a peace agreement, not for a ceasefire agreement.”
That is precisely why Hezbollah has rejected the deal. The group has long defended its weapons as essential tools of resistance against Israel. A framework that makes disarmament a precondition for Israeli withdrawal flips that logic: Hezbollah’s arsenal becomes the reason Israel stays, not the reason it leaves.
“Hezbollah doesn’t want to be disarmed. Hezbollah wants to preserve its power,” Zehavi said.
There are fears within Lebanon that Hezbollah will portray any Lebanese army effort to enforce the agreement as an assault on the Shiite community and on the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” raising the threat of civil conflict. Zehavi acknowledged that danger but said failing to confront Hezbollah carries its own serious risks.
Within Lebanon, the framework has generated sharply opposing reactions. Supporters see it as a possible escape from a permanent state of war, a route to rebuilding, and a chance to reclaim Lebanese sovereignty. Critics — particularly Hezbollah and its allies — describe it as capitulation, normalization under duress, or an arrangement that validates Israeli military presence until Hezbollah lays down its arms.
Marwan Abdallah, head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Lebanese Kataeb Party, argued that the Israel-Lebanon framework should be treated as a standalone agreement, not as an extension of the US-Iran diplomatic track. He said it has no connection to broader regional discussions involving Iran, Qatar, Oman, or Pakistan.
“Not Islamabad, not Tehran, not Qatar, not Oman. None of these processes is linked to the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel,” Abdallah told The Media Line.
In Abdallah’s view, the only acceptable role for Iran in Lebanon would be to sever its financial, political, and military ties with Hezbollah.
“As Lebanese, and I think as Israelis, we don’t acknowledge Iran’s role in our process,” he said. “If Iran wants to have a role in our process, the only role that it’s required to do is to stop supporting Hezbollah, stop financing it, stop giving it orders to support their front and to launch attacks, and help us dismantle the organization.”
“Otherwise, there’s no role for Iran, irrespective of what is mentioned in the MOU that they signed with Washington,” he added.
This is where the contradiction with the broader US-Iran framework becomes politically hazardous for Lebanon. The Israel-Lebanon agreement seeks to stop funds from reaching Hezbollah and other nonstate armed groups. But if Tehran receives economic relief under the US-Iran deal, critics of Hezbollah in Lebanon worry those resources could ultimately bolster Iran’s regional network.
Abdallah said Western assumptions that any unfrozen Iranian assets would be directed toward domestic needs reflect a misunderstanding of Iran’s ideological priorities.
“We know for a fact that none of the money will go to the people of Iran, and it will be used to support the terrorist activities of Iran,” Abdallah said. “So, this is a naive approach from the West and the Americans.”
Zehavi echoed that concern from an Israeli perspective, saying the two diplomatic tracks appear to undercut each other. The Israel-Lebanon agreement aims to block money from reaching Hezbollah, she noted, while the Iran-US track could provide Tehran with resources that might eventually find their way to the group.
“I don’t know how to solve this contradiction. This is something that America created, and they will have to solve it. Time will tell,” she said.
Despite their reservations, both analysts regard the Israel-Lebanon framework as a potential turning point — even as both remain cautious about whether it will actually be carried out.
For Abdallah, the pilot zones represent a practical test of whether the Lebanese army can assert state authority and dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure one village at a time. He said the army could receive intelligence through the monitoring mechanism — including from Israel and the United States — and then be directed to take control and clear Hezbollah infrastructure in one area before moving on to the next.
He described the Lebanese army’s role as essential because it would restore authority through a national institution rather than a foreign one.
“For us as Lebanese, it’s the Lebanese army that’s taking control, so it’s not a foreign army. And I think this is the best thing that can happen,” he said.
But Abdallah also acknowledged that the opportunity came only after enormous destruction in the south. He said Lebanon failed to act before Israel attacked, occupied territory, and destroyed many villages along with Hezbollah infrastructure. He blamed Hezbollah for launching a war it could not sustain and then refusing to surrender its weapons even after the devastation of southern Lebanon.
Abdallah argued that the framework should not be limited to areas south of the Litani River. If the pilot zones prove successful, he said, the same model should be extended across the entire south and eventually throughout Lebanon.
The political opening is connected to a deeper shift in Lebanese society. During the war, discussions about peace with Israel became less of a taboo in some Lebanese circles. Lebanese officials, including President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, took firmer stances against Hezbollah than many would have anticipated years ago. Israeli voices appeared on Lebanese television. Polling indicated that a growing number of Lebanese people no longer supported permanent confrontation with Israel.
Abdallah said Aoun and Salam represent a broad parliamentary majority and are acting in Lebanon’s national interest. He pointed to recent polling he said showed 55% of Lebanese supporting peace with Israel.
“Peace, not just cessation of hostilities, not going back to the truce of 1949,” Abdallah said.
That position directly challenges Hezbollah’s warning that disarmament would trigger civil war. Abdallah said the term is being misapplied. A clash between political parties or sectarian factions, he said, would constitute civil war — but a national army enforcing the law against an illegal armed group is an act of state authority, not civil conflict.
“But when the army, the legitimate army of the country, is implementing the law and the constitution of the country, and is given an order by the president, the prime minister, and the cabinet of the country to dismantle a military group that is illegal, it’s not a civil war. It’s a terrorist organization or a military group resisting the law enforcement entities and resisting the rule of law.”
Abdallah said Hezbollah is the only actor capable of turning the process violent.
“No one wants to do a civil war except for Hezbollah,” he said. “No one is capable of doing a civil war except for Hezbollah because they are the ones who are armed and have their own militia.”
He said the Lebanese state is offering alternatives, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs.
“We are proposing many nonviolent paths to disarm willingly, to create economic opportunities and incentives for the people who are in Hezbollah, to do a DDR process, to help them rebuild their villages, to help them go back to their villages,” he said.
“If you want to stay stubborn about what you are doing or what you are deciding because Iran asked you to, then you have to pay the price,” he added.
The question of recognition may be the most symbolically charged element of the entire framework. Lebanon and Israel have technically been at war since 1948. Even an indirect acknowledgment of Israel’s legitimacy is politically explosive in Lebanon, where Hezbollah and its allies have built much of their identity around armed resistance.
Abdallah said Lebanon has spent too many decades trapped in a cycle of war and that the time has come to pursue peace.
“I think it’s time. No human being lives to fight. No people in the world, no country in the world exists to keep fighting all the time,” he said.
He also drew a clear line between Lebanon’s national interests and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
“The idea of removing Israel from existence is not something that we believe in,” Abdallah said.
“There’s a problem between the Israelis and the Palestinians. It’s for the Israelis and the Palestinians to solve. It’s not for us, the Lebanese, to solve,” he said. “We are too small a country. We carried the Palestinian cause for 80 years now, and now is the time to move on.”
For Abdallah, the desire to end the conflict crosses sectarian lines.
“The decision is clear, and it’s cross-sectarian by the way. It’s not Christian only. The Sunnis, the Druze, the Christians, and some of the Shia are fed up with the war, and we want to live in peace,” he said.
“So yes, recognizing Israel is a big step, but it’s normal. The big step would be when we find peace, and this would mean ending 100 years of conflict,” he added.
On the Israeli side, Zehavi said communities in the north are not opposed to peace with Lebanon, but they are waiting to see whether the words translate into action on the ground.
“The feeling is: let’s wait and see,” she said. “This agreement will only be proved to be a success if it is implemented. And this is a question, whether it will be implemented. The people here are welcoming the idea of peace with Lebanon. Nobody is against that here.”
“But since we were disappointed so many times, we want to wait and see if it will succeed,” she added.
The weeks ahead will reveal whether Washington can manage both diplomatic tracks simultaneously — a regional deal with Iran that does not end up reviving Hezbollah, and an Israel-Lebanon framework that depends on Hezbollah’s weakening without destabilizing Lebanon from within.
The framework’s central premise is straightforward but politically explosive: Lebanon cannot reclaim its sovereignty while Hezbollah maintains an independent military role, and Israel will not fully pull back while Hezbollah retains the ability to return to the border.
The question now is whether the Lebanese state — backed by Washington and tolerated by Israel — can enforce that premise without the country being pulled into another internal crisis. For those who support the framework, this is the first genuine opening in decades. For those who oppose it, it represents forced surrender. For both Israel and Lebanon, it is a test of whether the end of one war can avoid becoming the start of another.
