During several hours spanning from Sunday evening into Monday, Iran launched multiple missile attacks against Israel following its warning of retaliation for Israeli operations in Beirut’s Dahiyeh district, disrupting a delicate ceasefire structure that had failed to resolve the fundamental conflict.
Israel subsequently attacked targets within Iran, hitting military and economic facilities, and reported intercepting missiles directed at its air bases. President Donald Trump publicly urged both nations to cease hostilities, stated that final discussions on what he termed “peace” were ongoing, and demanded an immediate end to the fighting.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, director of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and former head of the research division in Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Military Intelligence, explained to The Media Line that while the operation concluding with the April 8 ceasefire had ended, the war persisted due to the absence of a formal agreement to terminate it.
He described the renewed hostilities as reflecting mutual dissatisfaction rather than a random breakdown of arrangements. Iran faces pressure from US sanctions, economic difficulties, and weakened proxy forces. Israel remains unwilling to accept a situation where Hezbollah can rebuild or operate from Southern Lebanon while Iran attempts to deter Israeli actions there.
“Mostly the Iranians are worried because the situation is putting a lot of pressure on them. Their proxies are suffering heavily,” Kuperwasser observed. He added that Israel is also not satisfied because “we want the threat from Hezbollah to be much lower and better dealt with.”
The immediate catalyst involved Lebanon. Israel’s operation in Dahiyeh was limited, targeting two buildings following recent Hezbollah attacks. However, Iran had previously warned that any Israeli action in Dahiyeh would prompt direct retaliation. When Iranian missiles arrived, they seemed to confirm Tehran’s effort to connect two theaters that Israel and the United States have attempted to treat separately: Lebanon and the direct Israel-Iran confrontation.
Dr. Raz Zimmt, director of the Iran Program at the Institute for National Security Studies, explained to The Media Line that Tehran has spent weeks emphasizing connections between developments in Lebanon and those in Iran. He said Iran had made clear it would not accept a lasting arrangement with Washington while the Lebanese theater remained excluded from any deal.
Zimmt said the move reflected Iran’s ideological and strategic commitment to Hezbollah. “Iran, from both its ideological point of view, but also on the strategic level, finds it very important to make sure that everyone realizes that it doesn’t want to leave its allies in the region alone.”
That represents precisely the equation Israel says it cannot accept. Kuperwasser said Iran’s threat could not become an “immunity card” for Hezbollah. “We made it clear that we are not going to let Hezbollah deploy in the south. If they operate from the south, there’s going to be a price for that,” he said. “The Iranians were trying to prevent us from doing that by their threat.”
For Kuperwasser, the central issue is not whether Israel should launch another round or delay another day. It concerns whether Iran will be permitted to make itself a direct veto player over Israeli operations in Lebanon. “The most important thing is, of course, that our ability to take action in Lebanon is not limited and compromised,” he said. “We should not accept Iran becoming a player in Lebanon. That’s unacceptable.”
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the escalation in similar terms following the Israeli strikes. According to Israeli press reports, he said Iran and Hezbollah had attempted to impose an “equation” on Israel, where Hezbollah could fire from Lebanon, and Iran could respond directly, while Israel’s freedom of action was constrained. “This equation is intolerable and unacceptable to me,” he said.
Netanyahu said Hezbollah fire into Israeli territory led him to order strikes in Beirut, and that after Iran attacked Israel, he instructed the IDF to strike military and economic targets across Iran.
By Monday afternoon, Israeli press reports indicated Israel had agreed, at Trump’s request, to halt its strikes inside Iran, while continuing operations in Southern Lebanon “at full force.”
“At the moment, the fire on this front is halted,” Netanyahu confirmed, while warning that Israel would respond forcefully if Iran attacked again.
The distinction proved important. Israel was prepared to pause direct attacks on Iran, but not to accept any limit on its campaign against Hezbollah, including future strikes in Dahiyeh if attacks on northern Israeli communities continued. Defense Minister Israel Katz warned that Israel would not accept any Iranian attempt to link the Lebanon front to the direct Israel-Iran arena. “The fate of Dahiyeh in Beirut is the fate of the northern communities,” Katz said, according to Israeli press reports.
Within Israel, the renewed exchanges were felt not only through missile alerts but also through the rapid return of wartime procedures. Israel elevated its national alert status to orange, restricted press access on security grounds, and canceled nearly all committee meetings. The exceptions were politically telling: a discussion on establishing a government-backed political inquiry, rather than a state commission of inquiry, into the October 7 failures, and a committee session dealing with immunity for Likud MK Tally Gotliv, who faces charges over allegations that she disclosed the identity of a Shin Bet officer married to protest activist Shikma Bresler.
That contrast, national emergency on one side, domestic political business on the other, sharpened criticism from the opposition. During his Yesh Atid faction meeting at the Knesset on Monday, opposition leader Yair Lapid said the war itself had been justified and had proven Israel’s military power. But he argued that the government had failed to translate battlefield achievements into a strategic or diplomatic result.
Lapid said that after the announcement of the ceasefire in April, it became clear that the government “did not know how to turn victory into achievement,” did not define objectives for the diplomatic phase, did not advance the nuclear issue, did not address the ballistic missile threat or the Lebanon front, and did not coordinate adequately with the Americans or with regional allies.
“The government sent civilians back to shelters, schools are closed, the economy is paralyzed, without all this having any strategic goal that someone can understand, including inside the security establishment,” Lapid said at the faction meeting. He warned that Israeli citizens could bear almost anything if they knew there was a serious and defined objective. “But we are not given a clear and secure goal of any kind,” he said.
Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, by contrast, framed the moment before Israel’s retaliation as a test of sovereignty and deterrence. In a post written the night of June 7, before Israel struck Iran, Bennett said Israel faced “a moment of truth” over whether it was a sovereign state capable of defending itself. “A weak or symbolic response will signal to our enemies that the blood of our citizens has been spilled with impunity,” he wrote, adding that Israel had to act “with strength and effectiveness.”
The two opposition figures were not saying the same thing. Bennett’s message was that Israel had to hit back hard enough to prevent a dangerous precedent. Lapid’s was that military power without a political end state produces recurring rounds of escalation. Together, they captured the two competing pressures now confronting the government: the demand to preserve deterrence and the demand to explain where the fighting is supposed to lead.
Dr. Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, offered a pointed criticism of Israel’s current course. He said the latest escalation has produced “frustration and disappointment” because, unlike earlier stages of the war, many Israelis struggle to understand the immediate purpose.
“In the past, for example, during the last war with Iran, you could find most Israelis explaining that it was a kind of existential war and we knew, we understood what was the reason and what was the cause was,” Milshtein told The Media Line. “Right now, I think that even right-wing supporters, it is hard for them to really explain, okay, what are we doing exactly?”
Milshtein said Iran appeared more confident after the latest clash than many in Israel expected. “They are not deterred. They are full of influence. They are full of confidence,” he said of Iran. He argued that Tehran had managed to show it was prepared to take risks for Hezbollah and Lebanon without triggering the full-scale war Israel might have hoped would restore a clearer deterrence balance.
“I assess that the Iranians have much more achievements from the last clash than Israel,” Milshtein said. He described the Israeli strike in Dahiyeh as largely symbolic and questioned whether it provided real security benefits to residents of northern Israel or to soldiers operating in Lebanon. He noted that Israelis are looking for strategic explanations when the real answer is political.
Milshtein’s broader critique was that Israel’s military achievements have repeatedly outpaced its political planning. “Actually, there is no strategy for Israel,” he said. “There were fantastic military achievements, but because of the fact that no one wanted to speak about the end strategy, calculating the moves, we find ourselves in a situation that we are being forced by Trump to accept a settlement, a kind of political settlement.”
The question of President Trump’s role now sits at the center of the crisis. The American president has urged restraint, pressed Iran to return to negotiations, and signaled that a broader deal remains possible. President Trump said Monday that both sides were looking for an immediate ceasefire and that final negotiations on “peace” were proceeding. But Israel’s initial response showed that Jerusalem was still prepared to act militarily when it believed deterrence was at risk. The later decision to halt strikes in Iran at President Trump’s request showed the other side of the equation: Israel may insist on operational freedom, but Washington still has influence over the boundaries of escalation.
Marc Zell, chairman of Republicans Overseas Israel and vice president of Republicans Overseas, told The Media Line that he does not see the latest events as evidence of a serious rupture between Washington and Jerusalem. “I don’t believe the war ended,” he said. “The war continues, but it’s in a different form.”
Zell said President Trump is trying to manage several tracks at once—the battlefield, the American public, global energy markets, and the possibility, however slim, of a diplomatic arrangement. In Zell’s view, the American president must show voters that he is trying to end the fighting, while also maintaining pressure on Iran through military and economic means.
“He’s got to send a message to the American public and to the electorate about his efforts to put an end to the war,” Zell said. “… He’s also got to send, and he has been sending, messages to markets, domestic and global markets, with respect to oil and stock markets, capital markets generally.”
Zell rejected the idea that President Trump and Netanyahu are fundamentally at odds. “Of course, we can talk about disagreements. These are two vibrant, robust democracies,” he said. “I happen to believe that there are no real, substantive, material disagreements between the United States and Israel.” He added that Washington and Jerusalem may not agree “eye-to-eye on all the objectives of the fighting,” but said they agree on the essentials: Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missiles, and its proxy network.
Kuperwasser drew a similar distinction, saying that the disagreements visible this week are tactical rather than strategic. “At the end of the day, we want the same thing, and we operate together, and we fight together shoulder to shoulder in a very impressive way,” he said. “We exchange intelligence, and we are working very closely together. They take part in our defense. It’s very impressive. I don’t think that there is a strategic disagreement.”
But Kuperwasser also suggested that Trump may believe a deal is closer than Israeli officials do. “It seems that President Trump is under the impression that he’s close to having a long-sought deal,” he said. “I’m not sure that we are under the same impression …”
That gap may be exactly what Tehran is trying to exploit. Zimmt said Iran’s current leadership believes Trump does not want to return to full-scale war and that he may pressure Netanyahu to avoid a broader escalation. “The Iranian leadership really thinks, and I think they’re right, that President Trump doesn’t want to go to a full-scale war with Iran,” he said. “They look for any opportunity to put more pressure on Trump, assuming that when and if he reaches the conclusion that the status quo is unsustainable and unstable, he might be more willing to accept the Iranian conditions.”
From that perspective, Iran has become “a very self-confident player” since the war and especially since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran believes it can survive confrontation with the United States and Israel, Zimmt said, while using its leverage over energy routes, regional proxies, and missile capabilities to force recognition of its position.
Zimmt said it was increasingly clear that Iranian leaders believed they could not only survive a confrontation with the United States and Israel but also turn it to their advantage.
“It became more and more evident that the Iranian leadership has reached the conclusion that not only can it survive this confrontation with the US and Israel, but can actually use that in order to create a better situation and perhaps even some kind of regional architecture which would recognize Iran’s leverage and Iran’s ability to inflict major pain, not just to its regional neighbors, but also to the global economy,” he said.
For Zimmt, the only stable way out would be a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran. But he warned that any such arrangement would still face major unresolved issues, including the nuclear issue, frozen Iranian assets, and the broader question of security guarantees. “If there is no MOU, then both the developments in Lebanon and the ongoing sporadic incidents between the US and Iran in the Persian Gulf can certainly escalate again and again,” he said.
Milshtein said Israelis should focus above all on the nuclear question, not on slogans about regime change or claims of total victory. “The Israelis should ask themselves only one question, and this is what is going to happen to the nuclear threat. All the rest are not so important ….”
Kuperwasser also said the goals of the war must be understood precisely. He rejected the idea that Israel had formally declared regime change as the goal. “We never said that the goal of this war is to change the regime,” he said. “We said that we would like to create the conditions that would enable the Iranian people to change the regime.”
He said Israel and the United States achieved tangible military results, including damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities, ballistic missile production infrastructure, leadership, and military assets. But he acknowledged the limits of air power. “We cannot put an end to their ability to launch missiles. We cannot take away their highly enriched uranium [with] the use of air power. We cannot change the regime by the use of air power,” he said.
Israel, Iran, and the US are left in an unfinished phase. The ceasefire remains a framework, not a settlement. Lebanon remains outside the core arrangement, Iran is trying to link Hezbollah’s fate to its confrontation with Israel and Washington, and Israel is trying to preserve freedom of action in Lebanon while avoiding a broader direct war with Iran as Trump presses for a deal.
For Israelis, the return to shelters, the orange alert level, the cancellation of school and other educational activities, the restrictions on access to the Knesset, and the sudden halt to most normal legislative work made the stakes less abstract. President Trump is trying to keep negotiations alive. Iran has shown it can still impose costs. Israel is trying to preserve deterrence without losing Washington’s diplomatic framework. The ceasefire appears to have survived the latest exchange, but what it restrains is still being tested.
